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Abstract 
The history of international human rights law shows that the articulation of 
human rights has often been scripted around the experiences of some rather 
than all. For example: men. As the creation of the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) has 
tried to address specifically the oppression of women, has this 
fragmentation of some rather than all repeated itself? This study focuses on 
CEDAW’s family-related provisions and assesses whether they consider 
women of all sexual orientations as proper human rights subjects. That is, it 
is investigated whether CEDAW takes into account differences amongst 
women in regard to their sexual orientation and/or the sexual relation they 
are in. The method employed in this study is a feminist and queer critique of 
human rights, focusing on the socially and legally created norm and its 
assigned deviants. This analytical strategy is applied to the family-related 
provisions of CEDAW as well as the interpretive and monitoring work of 
CEDAW’s monitoring body, the CEDAW Committee. The key findings of the 
study show that CEDAW’s provisions relating to family issues do not value 
the diversity of women. Instead they are mostly scripted around the lives of 
heterosexual women, rendering heterosexual women the invisible norm as 
well as the main subject of women’s rights. It is moreover maintained that 
CEDAW is complicit in reinforcing a certain type of family (the 
monogamous heterosexual family) and in rendering this unit central to a 
woman’s life. While the CEDAW Committee has sometimes tried to include 
in the scope of CEDAW the experiences of lesbian, bisexual and queer 
women, its understanding of intersectional discrimination in regard to 
women’s sexual orientations has not yet infiltrated its ideas about the 
family. The main conclusion drawn from this research is that, in focusing on 
eliminating discrimination against women within the monogamous 
heterosexual family, CEDAW is complicit in legitimising this specific family 
unit, leaving unnoticed the wider oppressive aspects of it. The study 
recommends that the Committee adopts a general recommendation, 
reconceptualising the chapeau of Article 16(1) of CEDAW so as to instruct 
states to allow and enable women to develop freely their own understanding 
of family and to value and respect different forms of families, without 
discriminating amongst them. 
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Abbreviations 
 
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination against Women 
 
CEDAW Committee Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 
 
CO Concluding Observations 
 
CSW Commission on the Status of Women 
 
Committee Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women 
 
ECtHR European Court of Human Rights 
 
DEDAW Declaration on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women  
 
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights 
 
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights 
 
IPV intimate-partner violence 
 
LBQ lesbian, bisexual and queer 
 
NGO non-governmental organisation 
 
SRVAW United Nations Special Rapporteur on 
violence against women, its causes and 
consequences 
 
the Charter Charter of the United Nation 
 
UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights  
 
UN  United Nations 
 
VCLT Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
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“Clearly, the category of women is internally 
fragmented by class, color, age, and ethnic lines, 
to name but a few; in this sense, honoring the 
diversity of the category and insisting upon its 
definitional non-closure appears to be a 
necessary safeguard against substituting a 
reification of women's experience for the 
diversity that exists.” 
Judith Butler1  
 
 
 
                                                
1 ‘Gender Trouble, Feminist Theory, and Psychoanalytic Discourse’, in Linda J. Nicholson 
(eds), FEMINISM/ POSTMODERNISM (1990) 324, 327. 
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1 Introduction  
1.1 Background 
In 1789, at the height of the French Revolution, a legal document was 
passed by France’s National Constituent Assembly, giving men (quite 
literally men) rights vis-à-vis the State.2 This, of course, was the 
Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen, or the Declaration of the 
Rights of Men and of the Citizen. It is not only seen as a fundamental 
document of the French Revolution, but also as a significant part of the 
history of the development of human rights, imagining a community of 
equal citizens and declaring that human rights are universal.3 Two years 
later, in 1781, a new Constitution was ratified in France, containing the 
Declaration of the Rights of Men and of the Citizen in its preamble. As a 
response to the exclusion of women from the scope the Declaration, Olympe 
de Gouges published her own Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la 
citoyenne, or the Declaration of the Rights of Woman and of the Citizen, 
applying the rights contained in the Declaration to women and thereby 
exposing the exclusionary and discriminatory nature of rights of men.4  
 
On an international level, and more than 165 years later, human rights were 
set out to apply to both sexes equally, as stated, inter alia, in Article 2 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR): “Everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction 
of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other 
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status [emphasis 
added]”.5  However, employing a western liberal approach to international 
law, the Declaration (and, later, the two relating Covenants6) focused mainly 
on rights within the public sphere, from which women were mostly 
excluded, having had their ‘proper’ role in society assigned to the private 
sphere. It therefore arguably did also not set out to break down public / 
private dichotomy.7 While setting out to apply to men and women equally, 
the scope of the instruments was designed around the lives of men, often not 
                                                
2 Lynn Hunt (translation and eds), The French Revolution and Human Rights: A Brief 
Documentary History (St. Martin’s Press 1996) 77-9. 
3 Hunt (n 2) 77-9. 
4 Olympe De Gouges, ‘The Declaration of the Rights of Woman and Citizen’ in Hunt (n 2) 
124-9. 
5 Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in 1948. 
6 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), both adopted by the General 
Assembly in 1966. 
7 For a discussion of the normative structure of international law, including international 
human rights law, and the private / public dichotomy, see: Hilary Charlesworth, Christine 
Chinkin, and Shelly Wright, ‘Feminist Approaches to International Law’ in Robert J. Beck, 
Anthony Clark Arend, and Robert D. Vander Lugt, International Rules: Approaches from 
International Law and International Relations (Oxford University Press 1996) 256, 265-76, 
esp. 267. 
 6 
actually reaching the experiences of women and hence operated on an 
exclusionary level also.8 
 
A more refined attempt to include the lives of women in the scope of 
international human rights law was made with the adoption of the United 
Nations Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination 
against Women (CEDAW) in 1979, and its entry into force in 1981, exactly 
200 years after Olympe de Gouges wrote her Déclaration des droits de la 
femme et de la citoyenne.9 This move had been influenced and driven by 
demands – not least by the UN Commission on the Status of Women10 
(CSW) – for “a more comprehensive and well-targeted international focus 
on women, including development of a norm of non-discrimination against 
women within the emerging human rights legal framework.”11 Hence, 
CEDAW sought to render women the subject of a human rights framework 
created to expressly tackle forms of discrimination and human rights issues 
that are specific to women’s experiences. By doing so CEDAW even went 
so far as to introduce provisions on collective rights: “CEDAW in this 
respect seeks, not to liberate women one at a time by vindicating the legal 
rights of each, but to transform conditions affecting women collectively”12. 
Further breaking with the liberal legal tradition through entering into the 
private sphere, CEDAW sought not only to end discrimination against 
women within the private sphere, but equally sought to unlock doors for 
women to enter the public sphere.13  
 
However, the historical exclusion of the experiences and lives of women 
from the scope of (national and international) human rights law should 
produce a certain weariness in regard to another human rights’ claim to 
equality today, and even in relation to legislation that seeks to remedy such 
exclusions. Whom, despite its great ambitions, does human rights law 
protect and whom does it exclude from the scope of subjects of rights? 
These questions apply to CEDAW in the same way as they applied to the 
Declaration of the Rights of Men and of the Citizen, to the UDHR, to the 
ICCPR, and to the ICESCR.  
                                                
8 Brad R Roth, ‘The CEDAW as a Collective Approach to Women’s Rights’, (2002-3) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law 187, 191-2.  
9 General Assembly resolution 34/180 of 18 December 1979. 
10 UN Women, ‘Short History of CEDAW Convention’ (United Nations Department of 
Public Information) <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/history.htm> accessed 
16 May 2015. 
11 Christine Chinkin and Marsha A. Freeman, ‘Introduction’ in Marsha A. Freeman, 
Christine Chinkin, and Beate Rudolf, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms 
of Discrimination Against Women: A Commentary (OUP 2013) 5. 
12 Roth, (n 8) 192.  
13 For instance, Article 3 of CEDAW states: “States Parties shall take in all fields, in 
particular in the political, social, economic and cultural fields, all appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to ensure the full development and advancement of women, for the 
purpose of guaranteeing them the exercise and enjoyment of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms on a basis of equality with men.” Note that the private / public dichotomy itself 
can be and has been questioned as it appears to be a construct that helps to maintain 
unequal power relations, see Charlesworth, Chinkin, and Wright (n 7) 268-9. 
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1.2 Object of Study: The Subject of 
Women’s Rights 
Accepting the premise that, in its attempt to remedy the shortcomings of 
previously existing international human rights law and to target situations 
specific to ‘women’, CEDAW applies only to women (as opposed to 
women and men or as opposed to questioning the categories of women and 
men altogether), the question still remains whether CEDAW in fact 
considers all women as proper rights subjects? While seeking the 
elimination of discrimination against women, does CEDAW also account 
for their differences or do CEDAW’s provisions, and the interpretation 
thereof, themselves presuppose a certain idea of womanhood that one needs 
to fulfil in order to be afforded full protection? These are issues that this 
thesis seeks to touch upon by virtue of asking whether CEDAW’s family-
related provisions afford the same protection to women in same-sex and 
different-sex relations.  
 
This analysis is motivated by an assumption that CEDAW’s provisions 
relating to family and marriage focus on a liberation of women from ties 
binding them to the private sphere through the deconstruction of socially 
and culturally assigned roles of a woman and her (male) partner or husband 
and that such focus may therefore exclude from the topic of discussion 
women in same-sex relations. This is because whereas women in different-
sex rations have often been expected to pursue a specific type of family life, 
women in same-sex relations are often barred from doing so. Has CEDAW 
been able to, or will CEDAW be able to, accommodate both types of 
relations within its scope of protection? In this sense, this thesis involves a 
similar task which Olympe de Gouges undertook during the French 
revolution, that is, the task of exposing the exclusionary and discriminatory 
nature of a legal human rights instrument. In doing so, the concepts of 
family and marriage themselves will also be under interrogation. Who is the 
actual family that is ensconced in law, why is it this family that is afforded 
special protection, and how does it affect women in regard to the diversity 
of sexual relations they may be in? And further, how does it affect women 
who are in no sexual relations at all? 
1.3 Theoretical Considerations 
In chapter two of the thesis, I will put forward my analytical strategy, which 
constitutes a feminist critique and is inspired by several viewpoints within 
the feminist/queer conversation. It has as its underlying notion the 
understanding that ‘feminism’ is not solely the study of women as an 
oppressed group, but rather a study of how that oppression affects women 
differently and intersects with other forms of oppression. The inspiration for 
the analysis this thesis performs originates from the works of several 
academics and writers, as will be outlined. Influencing my analytical 
strategy, they will be drawn upon in discovering the silences, assumptions, 
and prescriptions within CEDAW, and within the work of the Committee on 
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the Elimination of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW Committee, or 
the Committee). 
 
The core of my analytical strategy consists of explorations of the natural 
and the deviant. These concepts are used in order to detect whether 
CEDAW itself defines a natural form of family and therefore allows 
regulation and discrimination against deviant families, and are further used 
in order to explore the institution of marriage itself within a women’s rights 
setting. Since queer theorists have sometimes criticised feminism to be 
concerned only with the lives of heterosexual women, the tenets of queer 
theory, especially in regard to the family, have influenced the analytical 
approach taken. In particular, the queer exercise of questioning the norm or 
the normal is utilised, as well as queer studies’ revelations of 
heterosexuality as an organizing institution. 
 
The explorations of queer theory of the natural and the deviant have 
influenced particular areas within feminism, while feminism too has 
influenced queer theory (as will be seen in chapter two). While the two 
strands of thought hence do not flow separately alongside each other, but 
instead intermingle, the present analysis firstly looks at how queer theorists 
have developed queer/feminist tools that detect social structures of 
exclusion, here with a particular focus on heteronormativity. It then moves 
on to take inspiration in the work of feminists’ who have worked with 
queer/feminist tools within a setting that has a particular focus on the 
oppression or exclusion of women. Two feminist scholars in particular have 
influenced my analytical strategy, both of whom focus on gender as well as 
heterosexuality and heteronormativity. Stevi Jackson views heterosexuality 
as a vital topic for feminism, maintaining that both gender and sexuality are 
social phenomena.14 Jackson argues that feminism’s focus on gender and 
queer study’s focus on heteronormativity both need to be taken into account 
for an effective critique of heterosexuality, as gender as a social hierarchical 
division is inherent in heterosexuality.15 Also drawn upon is the work of 
Martha Albertson Fineman that focuses on the ‘sexual family’ and how it is 
defined, especially in law, with the result of defining the normal family and 
thus allowing for regulation and discrimination against deviant families.16 
Her focus, while not deviating much from the queer strategy outlined above, 
influences my strategy in that she places this strategy within a particular 
family setting.  
 
As part of my analytical approach, Rebecca Cook’s and Simone Cusack’s 
Gender Stereotyping17 will be used as a tool to detect how laws and policies 
                                                
14 Stevi Jackson, ‘Sexuality, Heterosexuality, and Gender Hierarchy: Getting Our Priorities 
Straight’ in Chrys Ingraham (eds) Thinking Straight: the Power, the Promise, and the 
Paradox of Heterosexuality (Routledge 2005) 16. 
15 Ibid., 22. 
16 Martha Albertson Fineman, ‘The Sexual Family’ in Martha Albertson Fineman, Jack E. 
Jackson, and Adam P. Romero (eds), Feminist and Queer Legal Theory: Intimate 
Encounters, Uncomfortable Conversations (Ashgate 2009) 45-63. 
17 Rebecca J. Cook and Simone Cusack, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal 
Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 2010). 
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employ stereotypes to reproduce the oppression of women and subgroups of 
women, and how the normal is defined and the deviant is designated 
through harmful gender stereotypes. Cook and Cusack discuss sex 
stereotypes, sexual stereotypes, sex role stereotypes, and compounded 
stereotypes. Of particular interest will be implications of stereotypes for the 
exclusion or otherwise of certain women from the scope of protection of 
CEDAW. 
 
In light of the variety of concepts and viewpoints that have influenced my 
analytical approach, it is apparent that I do not subscribe to a ‘grand theory’ 
of feminism, seeking to expose a single truth concerning the oppression and 
liberation of women. Rather, my analytical approach aligns with the method 
described by Hilary Charlesworth: 
 
“Within feminist scholarship there is a tendency to pigeonhole theorists 
into fixed categories such as ‘liberal’, ‘cultural’, ‘radical’, ‘postmodern’ 
and ‘postcolonial’. But when confronted with a concrete issue, no single 
theoretical approach or method seems adequate. A range of feminist 
theories and methods are necessary to excavate the issues. In this sense, 
feminist explorations can be likened to an archaeological dig. There are 
various layers of practices, procedures, symbols and assumptions to 
uncover and different tools and techniques may be relevant at each 
level”.18 
 
Parts of the theories mentioned above will be used as such tools and 
techniques; employed in order to analyse and provide an answer to the 
question posed.   
1.4 Chapters 
Chapter three will present CEDAW, its legal framework and the CEDAW 
Committee. In addition to a general presentation of CEDAW, its place in the 
international legal framework and its objective and purpose, CEDAW’s 
provisions will be outlined. The CEDAW Committee will also be the 
subject of discussion, describing its composition and mandate as well as its 
role and influence in ending discrimination against women. 
 
Chapter four and five employ a two-step analysis, seeking to answer the 
question whether CEDAW’s provisions on family and marriage afford equal 
protection to women in same-sex and different-sex relations. Firstly, chapter 
four will investigate the wording of Article 1 of CEDAW, which defines 
discrimination against women, while chapter five will investigate the 
wording of family-related provisions of CEDAW, primarily those contained 
in Article 16. A second step within these chapters will look at some of the 
Committee’s interpretive work in the form of general recommendations. 
The exploration of these provisions and texts will employ my analytical 
                                                
18 Hilary Charlesworth, 'Feminist methods in international law' (1999) 93 American Journal 
of International Law 379, 381. 
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strategy outlined above and therefore will be a search for references to, and 
silences surrounding, sexual orientation as well as varying forms of 
relationships. Due to CEDAW’s age it will be particularly interesting to 
investigate how the Committee has applied or interpreted CEDAW’s 
provisions more recently and to answer the question of whether it has been 
able to remedy any constructions of womanhood that the bare provisions, 
adopted in 1979, entailed. Due to this reason, chapter six will analyse the 
Committee’s conversation on violence against women. Violence against 
women is not expressly addressed in CEDAW, but has been placed within 
the scope of the Convention through the Committee’s work.19  
 
The subject of analysis in chapter seven will be the communication 
exchange between the Committee and Germany in the context of Germany’s 
sixth periodic reporting under CEDAW. While according to ‘The Global 
Gender Gap Report 2014,’ Germany is the twelfth most gender-equal 
country out of the 142 States examined,20 inequalities between women in 
same-sex and different-sex relationships exist, inter alia, within the areas of 
family and marriage: women in same-sex relations do not enjoy the same 
domestic family and marriage rights as women in different-sex relations.21 It 
will therefore be of interest to analyse whether and how the CEDAW 
Committee has addressed or ignored family-related discrimination against 
lesbian, bisexual and queer (LBQ) women. The most recent concluding 
observations from other States will be mentioned in order to draw several 
comparisons. A few assumptions will lastly be made as to why the 
Committee addresses some issues concerning LBQ women while ignoring 
others. 
 
In the last chapter it will be concluded that CEDAW’s provisions relating to 
family issues do not value the diversity of women and instead are mostly 
scripted around the lives of heterosexual women, rendering heterosexual 
women the invisible norm as well as the main subject of women’s rights. It 
will moreover be maintained that CEDAW is complicit in reinforcing the 
stereotypical heterosexual monogamous family and in rendering this unit 
central to a woman’s life. While the Committee has not yet been able or 
willing to remedy the found discrimination against women who deviate 
from the created norm, an idea of a reconstruction of Article 16 will be put 
forward in the conclusion.  
1.5 Sources  
The thesis draws on several primary and secondary sources. Within the 
category of primary sources will be legal instruments, both international and 
                                                
19 Especially through general recommendation no. 19: CEDAW Committee, ‘General 
Recommendation No. 19’ (1992) contained in UN Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9. 
20 World Economic Forum, The Global Gender Gap Report 2014 (World Economic Forum, 
2014). 
21 See for instance: ‘Act on Registered Life Partnerships’ (Bundesministerium der Justiz 
und für Verbraucherschutz, 20 June 2014) <http://www.gesetze-im-
internet.de/englisch_lpartg/index.html> accessed 11 February 2015. 
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national. The most important and relevant of which will of course be 
CEDAW, but other instruments, such as the Optional Protocol to CEDAW, 
and German family law legislations will also be used. Further primary 
sources include various works of the CEDAW Committee, such as its 
general recommendations and concluding observations. Additionally, 
CEDAW’s travaux préparatoires will be  used. The category of secondary 
sources will mostly be occupied by feminist articles and texts, both in terms 
of feminist or queer theories and feminist assessments of international law 
and CEDAW specifically. A state reports as well as a report from non-
governmental organisations (NGOs), in the form of a ‘Shadow Report’ to 
CEDAW, will also be drawn upon in the case study.  
1.6 Delimitations 
Although a study of all the constructions and silences regarding women’s 
different lives and experiences within CEDAW, including all of CEDAW’s 
articles, would provide a fuller picture of whom CEDAW does and does not 
protect, this is only a limited study, focusing on CEDAW’s family-related 
provisions and a relating comparison between women in same-sex and 
different-sex relations. While of course most of CEDAW’s provisions can, 
in on way or another, be related to family life, as one’s family life is 
influenced by many factors, this analysis looks at mostly at CEDAW’s 
Articles 16, 2 and 5, as well as at the topic of violence against women.  
 
The study is further limited to exploring the Committee’s exchange with, 
and views on, one country, namely Germany. It may therefore be limited in 
that it employs a somewhat Western European analysis. Also removed from 
the scope of study is the relevant question (as mentioned earlier) to what 
extend it is useful to limit the scope of CEDAW to ‘women’.22 Lastly, 
despite its general claim to investigate the subject of women’s rights, the 
investigation is limited to the scope of CEDAW as the main international 
legal women’s rights instrument, though a further investigation of other 
documents, such as the non-binding Beijing Declaration and Platform for 
Action23, or CEDAW’s relation to the Yogyakarta Principles24 would also 
be relevant.  
                                                
22 See, Darren Rosenblum, ‘Unsex CEDAW: What’s Wrong with “Women’s Rights”’ 
(2011) 20.2 Columbia Journal of Gender and Law 98-194; and Berta Esperanza Hernandez-
Truyol, ‘Unsex CEDAW? No! Super-Sex it!’ (2011) 20 Columbia Journal of Gender & 
Law 195. 
23 United Nations, ‘Report of the Fourth World Conference on Women’ (1995). 
24 The Yogyakarta Principles were established by group of international human rights 
experts in 2006 and address principles of international human rights law in their application 
to issues of sexual orientation and gender identity. See: ‘The Yogyakarta Principles on the 
Application of International Human Rights Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and 
Gender Identity’ (2006) <http://www.yogyakartaprinciples.org/principles_en.htm> 
accessed 23 May 2015. 
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2 Theory and Methodological 
Considerations 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter outlines my analytical strategy through mapping the theoretical 
considerations that have influenced the way in which CEDAW’s family-
related provisions and the Committee’s related work shall be investigated in 
chapters four to seven. My analytical strategy, a feminist critique of 
CEDAW, finds its inspirations in relevant feminist and queer deliberations 
and explores the topic under consideration in the light of these. By doing so, 
it seeks to fulfil one of feminism’s main tasks, that is, as put by Adrienne 
Rich, “[t]o question everything. To remember what it has been forbidden to 
even mention.”25 Further, Catherine MacKinnon has defined feminist 
jurisprudence as “an examination of the relationship between law and 
society from the point of view of all women”26. While the current analysis 
does indeed seek to partake in the task of exploring the relationship between 
law and society from the point of view of all women, unlike MacKinnon 
whose theory is rather essentialist, focusing on men’s sexual domination 
over women and therefore focusing on the experience of heterosexual 
women, this analysis deems it necessary to explore the term all women 
differently27. All women are not seen as a homogenous group, but rather the 
interest lies in their diverse identities and, for the purposes of the present 
analysis, in their diverse sexual relations. Lastly, while the current analysis 
does not claim or seek to be a closed conversation, offering a clear solution 
to a clear problem, it does anticipate to be forward looking in the spirit of 
Heather Ruth Wishik’s words: “Feminist jurisprudence (…) inquires not 
only into the harms of patriarchal law, but also into the possibility and 
characteristics of a world without patriarchal law, and of a non-patriarchal 
system.”28 Patriarchy, a system of male dominance over women, will be 
further conceptualized below. 
 
The field of feminist scholarship is wide and multifaceted, running not only 
in three – more or less temporal – waves29, but also in various theoretical 
                                                
25 Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets, and Silence: Selected Prose, 1966-1978 (Norton 1980) 
13. 
26 Cited in Heather Ruth Wishik, ‘To Question Everything: The Inquiries of Feminist 
Jurisprudence’ in D. Kelly Weisberg (eds), Feminist Legal Theory: Foundations (Temple 
University Press 1993) 22. 
27 Though, as will later be argued, the discrimination against LBQ women often relates to 
men’s sexual domination over women in that the discrimination is employed as a tool to 
bring women within the sexual domination of men, or to punish them for escaping from the 
scope of it.  
28 Wishik (n 26) 23. 
29 First wave feminism, the focus of which was on de jure inequalities or officially 
mandated inequalities, began in the UK and the USA around the nineteenth century and 
lasted until the early twentieth century; second wave feminism, the focus of which was on 
 13 
approaches, such as liberal feminism, radical feminism, cultural feminism, 
black feminism, marxist and socialist feminism, third world feminism, and 
post-modern feminism, to name but a few.30 Even within these different 
theoretical approaches, numerous viewpoints are offered. Rather than to 
place my analysis neatly within a particular theoretical approach, my 
analytical strategy draws upon several selected viewpoints from the 
intersecting fields of feminism and queer theory, identifying two common 
elements and connecting them. Firstly, these viewpoints seek to improve 
women’s conditions of life and, secondly, they set out to abolish categories 
and the categorization of women.  
 
Believing that queer theory and feminist conversations have informed, 
influenced and collaborated with one another, my analytical strategy is 
influenced by aspects of both. The chapter outlines and explores the basic 
ideas and relevant aspects of, firstly, queer theory and, secondly, feminism 
that have influenced and inspired my analytical approach and sets out how 
they are drawn upon throughout the study. While, as mentioned in the 
introduction, queer theory and feminism are not clearly separated fields, 
they will nevertheless be dealt with in different sections of this chapter. This 
is partly the case in order to pay attention to the different principal emphases 
of these fields, with queer theory having their main focus on 
heteronormativity and feminism having their main focus on patriarchy 
(though it will also be argued that a strong interdependent link exists 
between heteronormativity and patriarchy). The division is further justified 
by practical reasons, that is, in order to generate a structured presentation of 
the theoretical influences. It is therefore not implied that this division is 
obvious and indisputable. The chapter ends by briefly outlining the method 
of treaty interpretation that is required by my analytical strategy and which 
will be employed in chapters four to six. 
2.2 Queer Influences 
Of great influence to queer theory are Judith Butler’s notions of the 
performative gender and the heterosexual matrix, which she develops in 
Gender Trouble, upon which many queer theorists (and feminists) draw.31 
Butler maintains that, in order to be regarded a woman or a man, one has to 
                                                                                                                        
de facto inequalities or substantive inequality, took place from the 1960s to the 1980s 
(though some argue that it is still taking place), and urged women to understand that parts 
of their personal lives in fact reflected sexists structures of power but was later criticized for 
its essentialist approach; third wave feminism, which started in the 1990s, felt a failure of 
second wave feminism, and hence focuses on intersectionality and the deconstruction of 
categories: for instance, see: Rosemarie Tong, Feminist Thought: A More Comprehensive 
Introduction (third edn., Westview Press 2009); for second and third wave feminism, see: 
Patricia A. Cain, ‘Feminist Jurisprudence: Grounding the Theories’, in D. Kelly Weissberg 
(eds), Feminist Legal Theory Foundations (Temple University Press 1993) 359, 359-63.  
30 For a brief overview of different feminist approaches see, for example: Hilary 
Charlesworth and Christine Chinkin, The Boundaries of International Law (Manchester 
University Press 2000) 23-59. 
31 Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (First published 
1990, Routledge 1999).  
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be of a certain sex, perform a certain gender that is assigned to that sex, and 
have sexual desires towards a person with the opposite sex and gender.32 It 
is important to note that Butler argued that gender is not a being, not a noun, 
but rather a doing.33 One is not a free agent, able to choose one’s gender but 
instead one is done by gender. As Sara Salih explains in a commentary on 
Butler’s work, this is because “there is no ‘natural body’ which pre-exists 
culture and discourse, since all bodies are gendered from the beginning of 
their social existence”34. Though not being a free agent, one can still have 
agency.35 Then, if one falls outside of one of the three categories of the 
heterosexual matrix, society employs certain forceful means in trying to 
keep one within this heterosexual matrix:  
 
“Butler points out that people who fail to ‘do’ their gender correctly [for 
instance, who do not desire a person of the opposite sex and assigned 
gender], or who do it in ways which accentuate its genealogy and 
construction, are punished by cultures and laws which have vested 
interests in maintaining a stable distinction between surface and depth, 
sex and gender, the body and the psyche, homosexual and heterosexual, 
masculine and feminine.”36  
 
Rather than focusing on exclusions by studying only the excluded, the 
deviant, the margins, or the periphery, queer theory hence focuses on the 
presupposed natural core itself as well as on the construction of categories. 
In the words of S. Crawley and K. Broad, queer theory sees the world as 
“composed of falsely bounded categories that give the impression of fixity 
and permanence where none ‘naturally’ exists”37. A queer analysis, then, is 
concerned with deconstructing such categories, which often exist in the 
form of binaries that are in fact power relations.38  
 
Within the queer exercise of the deconstruction of binaries and categories, 
queer studies focus on heterosexuality and heteronormativity. 
Heteronormativity has been described as being “an ideological code that 
promotes rigidly defined conventional gender norms, heterosexuality, and 
‘traditional family values’”.39 It is the institutionalization of heterosexuality 
and may act as an invisible means of organising society. Chrys Ingraham 
engages with the concept of heteronormativity through the introduction of 
her concept of thinking straight. She explains: “Historically, the phrase 
                                                
32 Judith Butler, ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire’ in Joanne Connagan, Feminist Legal 
Studies (vol. I, Routledge  2009) 267, 272-3. 
33 Ibid., 288-9. 
34 Sara Salih and Judith Butler (eds), The Judith Butler Reader (Blackwell Publishing 2004) 
91. 
35 Butler ‘Subjects of Sex/Gender/Desire’ (n 32) 289-96.  
36 Salih and Butler (n 34) 93. 
37 S. Crawley and K. L. Broad, ‘The Construction of Sex and Sexualities’ in J. Holstein and 
J. Gubrium (eds), Handbook of Constructionist Research (Guilford Press 2008) 545, 551. 
38 Ramona Faith Oswald, Katherine A. Kuvalanka, Libby Balter Blume, and Dana 
Berkowitz, ‘Queering “The Family”’, in Sally A. Lloyd, April L. Few and Katherine R. 
Allen, Handbook of Feminist Family Studies (SAGE publications 2009) 43, 44.  
39 Ibid., 44. 
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‘thinking straight’ meant thinking clearly or logically. The paradox in the 
use of this metaphor to describe heterosexuality is that thinking straight 
rearranges the original meaning by embracing the logical incoherence, in 
this case, of institutionalized heterosexuality.”40 She further describes that 
thinking straight is a way of thinking which hides the institutionalized 
character of heterosexuality and creates the image of heterosexuality as 
being natural and given.41 As Chrys Ingraham argues, “[c]onstructed notions 
of sexual behaviour and sexual identity have become primary organizing 
categories for many key aspects of social life including but not limited to, 
marriage, family, politics, religion, work and education.”42  
 
These deliberations have influenced parts of the feminist conversation in 
several ways, inter alia, through engaging in the task of eradicating 
categories, as will be seen below. Having made significant revelations in the 
areas of norms and deviants and the reproduction of heterosexuality, the 
above described aspects of queer theory informed my analytical strategy and 
will be drawn upon in order to explore the relation between CEDAW’s 
family-related provisions and heteronormativity, straight thinking, and the 
heterosexual matrix. 
2.3 Feminist Influences 
Reiterating that there is no clear-cut division between queer theory and 
feminism, many feminist scholars have corresponded with the tenants of 
queer theory outlined above. Such feminist works have influenced my 
analytical approach, as they too have detected heteronormativity and 
heterosexuality as a social construct. They are most valuable for an analysis 
within a women’s rights setting in that they also focus on the relationship 
between heteronormativity and patriarchy.  
 
One of the feminist scholars who has influenced my approach is Stevi 
Jackson. In her chapter “Sexuality, Heterosexuality, and Gender 
Hierarchies: Getting our Priorities Straight”, Jackson draws attention to 
heterosexuality as a vital topic within feminism.43 Jackson, who maintains 
that her work derives from materialist feminism44, argues that both gender 
and sexuality are social phenomena.45 She defines gender as “a hierarchical 
social division between women and men embedded both in social 
institutions and social practices. Gender is thus a social structural 
phenomenon, part of the social order, but is also lived by embodied 
individuals who ‘do gender’ in their daily lives, constantly (re)producing it 
through habitual, everyday interaction”.46 While Jackson distinguishes 
                                                
40 Chrys Ingraham, ‘Introduction’ in Chrys Ingraham (eds) Thinking Straight: the Power, 
the Promise, and the Paradox of Heterosexuality (Routledge 2005) 1, 3. 
41 Ibid., 4. 
42 Ibid., 2. 
43 Jackson (n 14) 15-37. 
44 Ibid., 16. 
45 Ibid., 16. 
46 Ibid., 16.  
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between gender and sex, defining gender as stated above, she maintains that 
biological sex, and seeing biological differences, are also connected to 
social acts, since “[i]t is gender that enables us to see biological sex“47.48  
 
Importantly, Jackson does not see the categories produced by the binary 
gender division as homogenous, thus taking into account the diversity of 
other distinctions that may intersect with gender.49 One such distinction is 
sexuality. Jackson sees a need to challenge the “taken-for-granted view of 
heterosexuality as a natural, uncontestable fact of human nature”50.  
However, she views heterosexuality as an institution not only concerned 
with sexuality, but also with non-sexual elements that are seen as normal 
and are used to define the deviant: “While heterosexual desire, practices, 
and relations are socially defined as ‘normal’ and normative, serving to 
marginalize other sexualities as abnormal and deviant, the coercive power of 
compulsory heterosexuality derives from its institutionalization as more 
than merely a sexual relation”51.  
 
While Jackson detects shared concerns between feminism and queer theory, 
such as both assess and challenge the ways in which male-dominated 
heterosexuality is seen as normal, she also maintains that the focus of 
feminism has traditionally been that of male-dominance whereas the focus 
of queer studies has been that of heteronormativity. According to Jackson, 
however, an effective critique of heterosexuality (as defined by her) ought to 
take into account the focuses of both feminism and queer studies. She states: 
“Such a critique involves more than simply a synthesis of queer and 
feminism: it necessarily entails an understanding of gender as a hierarchical 
social division since this is intrinsic to heterosexuality”52. She urges for a 
study that takes into account social structures and the material conditions 
under which sexualities are lived rather than a study that merely focuses on 
texts, discourses and social practices.53  
 
It is within this context that Jackson criticises Butler. She accuses Butler of 
being interested in gender and heterosexuality solely in terms of “norms 
against which the destabilizing possibilities of gender and sexual 
transgression can be asserted”54 and thereby leaves out of the discussion the 
gender hierarchy, which is internal to heterosexuality.55 Here, Jackson 
appears to be pointing towards a tension between the two elements that 
                                                
47 Ibid., 17. 
48 While the distinction between sex and gender, sex referring to the biological and gender 
referring to the social construct assigned to each of the sexes, has been an important 
revelation to feminist scholarship, this distinction has long been called under question. For 
instance, see Butler as above; and Dianne Otto, ‘Lost in Translation: Re-Scripting the 
Sexed Subjects of International Human Rights Law’ in Dianne Otto, Gender Issues and 
Human Rights Volume I (Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2013) 241.  
49 Jackson (n 14) 17. 
50 Ibid., 16.  
51 Ibid., 18.  
52 Ibid., 22.  
53 Ibid., 22.  
54 Ibid., 25.  
55 Ibid., 24-5. 
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connect the viewpoints influencing my analytical strategy, that is, the 
improvement of women’s condition of life and the abolishment of 
categories. Perhaps, though, this tension is not necessarily fatal. A political 
strategy might at times require the maintenance or acknowledgment of 
categories, such as ‘women’, as a momentary social fact in order to achieve 
the improvement of ‘women’s’ conditions of life. While many – queer and 
feminist theorists – would perhaps agree with this, it is not to say that the 
deconstruction of categories cannot simultaneously exist on an academic 
level, influencing the political strategy where appropriate and possible. 
 
Still, Jackson’s revelations are useful for the current analysis in that they 
enable me to maintain that patriarchal and heteronormative structures 
necessarily depend on, and reinforce each other. This assumption will find 
support in considerations made throughout this thesis and relies on the line 
of thought that patriarchy is in fact strongest where heterosexuality is an 
essential part of the situation. This is specifically the case with the 
subordination of the woman in a stereotypical heterosexual family (see 
below, chapter 5.1). Patriarchy’s strong collaboration with a heterosexual 
component in some sites then also creates the basis for discrimination in 
other sites, rendering heterosexuality an essential part of patriarchy’s 
structures. For instance, the 2008 financial crisis caused both women and 
men to lose their jobs, however, as discussed by the CSW, women were 
often first to be fired due to an assumption that not women but men were the 
breadwinners of the family and hence were more entitled to keep their 
jobs.56 Women were therefore fired based on the assumption that they were 
part of a sexual family, in which their husbands/male partners would care 
for them financially. Due to this interdependency of patriarchy and 
heteronormativity, where I refer to heteronormativity or patriarchy, these 
terms include an understanding of one another and, unless the context 
indicates otherwise, could be substituted with the term heteropatriarchy.  
 
A second feminist scholar who intersects notions of gender and 
heterosexuality, and who has influenced my analytical approach, is Martha 
Albertson Fineman, in regard to her work on the ‘sexual family’.57 Focusing 
on the family, and how it and its deviants are protected or regulated by law, 
her work is in line with the queer/feminist line as described above and is 
relevant for the purpose of the present analysis. Albertson Fineman explains 
that she has modified the word ‘family’ to ‘sexual family’ in order to expose 
that both society and law view and expect a family to be arranged around a 
sexual affiliation between a man and a woman.58 She explains: “The sexual 
family is the traditional or nuclear family, a unit with a heterosexual, 
formally celebrated union at its core.”59 She then argues that the reflection 
of the sexual family in law, which is mostly in the form of marriage, 
                                                
56 Commission on the Status of Women, ‘Emerging issues, trends and new approaches to 
issues affecting the situation of women or equality between women and men: 
Gender perspectives of the financial crisis’ (2009) UN Doc E/CN.6/2009/CRP.7, 6. 
57 Albertson Fineman ‘The Sexual Family’ (n 16) 45-63. 
58 Ibid., 45.  
59 Ibid., 45. 
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constitutes the basis for state regulation.  By defining the appropriate family 
in law, granting it protection and benefits, the normal is defined, through 
which the deviant can then be designated. In turn, Albertson Fineman 
explains, “[t]he characterization of some family groupings as deviant 
legitimizes state intervention and the regulation of relationships well beyond 
what would be socially tolerated if directed at more traditional family 
forms”60. In law, it is assumed that the family in the form of a sexual 
affiliation between a man and a woman is natural. Through the sexual 
family, it is also ensured that men are seen as essential to the family; the 
persistence of the sexual family as the idealized union both in social and 
legal thought has forced us to recreate patriarchy.61  
 
Challenges to the sexual family in terms of legal changes that we have seen, 
for instance in the form of same-sex marriage, are also viewed as 
problematic by Albertson Fineman: “By duplicating the privileged form, 
alternative relationships merely affirm the centrality of sexuality to the 
fundamental ordering of society and the nature of intimacy”62. Instead, 
feminist revelations about marriage and family issues and practices, such as 
domestic violence, “call into question the whole concept of the nuclear 
family as a legally privileged unit that is entitled to special status as an 
essential form of social organization”63.  
 
Albertson Fineman’s revelations have influenced my analytical strategy in 
that they focus on the family itself, exposing how its inscription into law 
produces deviants and allows for the regulation of and discrimination 
against such deviants. Albertson Fineman further exposes negative 
implications of simply extending the legally protected form of family 
(marriage) to same-sex couples. Her theory then, has already laid 
groundwork on how the law and society intersect in regard to the sexual 
family. This thesis will draw upon her revelations, placing them within a 
women’s rights setting, that is, CEDAW’s provisions on family and 
marriage.  
2.4 Gender Stereotyping 
Stereotypes have a great impact on the way in which society perceives, 
maintains and reproduces ideas about family life and marriage. As a tool of 
my theoretical approach, Rebecca Cook’s and Simone Cusack’s work on 
harmful gender stereotyping will be drawn upon to detect how laws and 
policies employ stereotypes to reproduce the oppression of women and 
subgroups of women, and how the normal is defined and the deviant is 
designated through harmful gender stereotypes.  
 
                                                
60 Ibid., 46.  
61 Ibid., 47-8. 
62 Ibid., 45. 
63 Ibid., 55-6. 
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With their work, Gender Stereotyping: Transnational Legal Perspectives, 
Cook and Cusack have started an important dialogue on gender stereotyping 
and its harmful consequences, focusing on the role of law and its 
application. According to Cook and Cusack, stereotypes are widely accepted 
beliefs about the characteristics of certain groups of people. Stereotyping, 
then, is the action of directly or indirectly, consciously or unconsciously 
applying such stereotypes to individuals belonging to that group, and 
through it forming an opinion, presumption, or expectation in connection 
with the individual. 64 While gender stereotypes may be both positive and 
negative, they are always dangerous as they prevent individuals as being 
seen as such, and rather are judged according to the group they belong to.65 
Stereotypes can therefore be harmful; they do not only lead to 
misrecognition but also force individuals into certain behaviour.66  
 
While on the one hand, people use stereotyping in order to make the world 
understandable to them, stereotypes are also employed in order to assign 
differences and in order to script identities. Stereotyping can have the 
purpose and effect of assigning differences, as it allows people to deviate 
members of certain groups from themselves and see them as ‘others,’ 
without having to understand differences and without having to see people 
belonging to that group as individuals. Members of that group can be 
marginalised through the assignment of differences and the group can be 
further subordinated.67 A third reason for which stereotypes are employed is 
in order to script identities, that is, the prescription of certain characteristics, 
roles and behaviours that people belonging to that group ought to conform 
to. Cook and Cusack name these prescriptive or normative stereotypes.68   
 
Gender stereotyping is the process of stereotyping based on a “social and 
cultural construction or understanding of men and women, due to their 
different physical, biological, sexual and social functions”.69 Cook and 
Cusack maintain that the term ‘gender stereotype’ is a reflection of the 
social and cultural construction of ‘women’ and ‘men’ and can therefore 
differ and evolve temporally, depending on culture and society.70 It also not 
only includes stereotypes about men and women, but also sub-groups of 
women and men71, such as LBQ women. Cook and Cursack subscribe to the 
position that the elimination of gender stereotypes (especially of women, on 
whom their work focuses) is vital for the emancipation of women. This 
claim is based on a social construction thesis, holding that the roles, 
characteristics and attributes people assign to women, are socially 
constructed in a way that are inferior to those of men, thereby maintaining 
unequal power relationships.72  
                                                
64 Cook and Cusack (n 17) 1.  
65 Ibid., 12. 
66 Ibid., 18. 
67 Ibid., 16-8.  
68 Ibid., 18-20. 
69 Ibid., 1-2. 
70 Ibid., 2. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid. 
 20 
 
Within the category of gender stereotypes, Cook and Cursack explore four 
specific forms they may take (although it is not argued for the 
exhaustiveness of the list). Firstly, gender stereotypes may take the form of 
sex stereotypes. These are stereotypes connected to physical and biological 
attributes or characteristics of men and women73, such as the stereotype that 
men are physically stronger than women (or, one may add, the very 
stereotype that all women have a vagina as their reproductive organ). A 
second form is that of sexual stereotypes, which “endow men and/or women 
with specific sexual characteristics or qualities that play a role in sexual 
attraction and desire, sexual initiation and intercourse, sexual intimacy, 
sexual possession, sexual assault, transactional sex and sexual 
objectification and exploitation”74. For instance, women are often 
stereotyped as men’s sexual property.75 The third form of gender stereotypes 
identified by Cook and Cursack is that of sex role stereotypes, which entail 
a normative view of roles and behaviour that are regarded as appropriate for 
women and men.76 An example of this could be that a woman ought to 
behave in a certain way so as to be regarded a good mother. Lastly, 
compounded stereotypes are stereotypes that result from the 'membership' of 
different groups, such as ‘women’ and ‘homosexual women’.77 Such 
compounded stereotypes often convey (wrong) messages about the roles 
people belonging to the subgroup should play in society.78 
 
Cook and Cursack argue that it is vital for States to understand why and 
how gender stereotyping is used as it helps them to detect assumptions 
about women upon which their laws, policies, and practices are based.79 
While Gender Stereotyping addresses the roles various state and non-state 
actors can and should take in the dismantling of harmful gender stereotypes, 
of specific interest is Cook and Cursack’s focus on the CEDAW Committee 
and their instructions for states on this matter.80 I additionally argue that 
CEDAW itself as well as the work of the Committee ought to undergo a 
gender stereotyping assessment. As such, Cook and Cursack’s claims fit in 
well with the queer and feminist considerations discussed above, as they 
address intersectional oppression of women (through compounded 
stereotypes) and the creation of deviants. They further argue for an exposure 
and eradication of such in order to improve the conditions of women’s lives. 
They therefore form important archaeological tools to discover harmful 
gender stereotypes that are at work in CEDAW’s family-related provisions 
in order to favour, reproduce, and maintain the heterosexual woman.  
                                                
73 Ibid., 25. 
74 Ibid., 27.  
75 Ibid. 
76 Ibid., 28.  
77 Ibid., 29-30. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., 139. 
80 Ibid., 137. 
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2.5 Treaty Interpretation 
It ought to be noted that my analytical approach does not at all times follow 
the rules of interpretation contained in the Vienna Convention on the Laws 
of the Treaties (VCLT), when analysing and interpreting CEDAW’s family-
related provisions. Article 31 of VCLT states that a “treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object 
and purpose”, whereas Article 32 provides that supplementary means of 
interpretation are to be used only to confirm the result of the ordinary 
interpretation,81 or when such interpretation leaves the terms ambiguous,82 
or absurd or unreasonable83. The approach followed in the current analysis 
requires a slight departure from these rules, as the purpose of the reading 
differs from that of general treaty interpretation. While general treaty 
interpretation seeks to answer lex lata questions, my analysis is geared 
towards revealing certain social presuppositions in which CEDAW’s 
provisions are embedded. In interpreting the relevant provisions, the 
ordinary meaning of the words used will be looked behind in order to 
discover whether CEDAW and its provisions are thinking straight, to 
borrow Ingraham’s terminology. Further, the travaux prepartoires are made 
use of in order to analyse the heteronormative, or otherwise, narrative in the 
process leading up to the adoption of CEDAW. 
 
Bringing together the different influences outlined in this chapter, my 
analytical strategy seeks to detect a created norm, and its assigned deviants, 
in legal texts and social practices. The focus of this task will be on different 
sexual orientations of women. The strategy also seeks to analyse the norms’ 
tangible effects on women’s lives. These aims are achieved through using 
the tools provided by the academic writings of Butler, Jackson, Ingraham, 
Albertson Fineman and Cook and Cusack.  
                                                
81 Article 32, VCLT. 
82 Article 32(a), VCLT. 
83 Article 32(b), VCLT.  
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3 CEDAW: Placement and 
Substance 
This chapter provides insight into the legal instrument under investigation in 
this study, namely CEDAW. By providing such insight it enables a deeper 
understanding of the content and functioning of CEDAW and therefore 
places the analysis contained in chapters four to seven in a specific context. 
The chapter starts by outlining the history leading to the adoption of 
CEDAW and then moves on to present the content of CEDAW. It does so 
by giving a summary of both the structure and general content of its articles, 
as well as the core special features that have been identified by several 
commentators. Lastly, the chapter is concerned with the role CEDAW gives 
to its monitoring body, the Committee, by critically describing both its 
composition and mandate. This is especially important as the Committee’s 
work will be under interrogation throughout the rest of the study and 
therefore knowledge of its abilities and limitations are of vital importance.  
3.1 History Leading to CEDAW 
With the birth of the Charter of the United Nation (“the Charter”), which is 
often said (at least from a Western perspective) to have triggered the birth of 
the legal international human rights framework, came the first sex-equality 
provision in international law.84 The Preamble of the Charter refers to 
“equal rights of men and women”, while Article 1(3) of the Charter provides 
for the promotion and encouragement of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms “for all without distinction as to (…) sex”. As described above, 
the Article of the later UDHR also entailed a non-discrimination provision, 
as did the two legally binding Covenants that derived from it.  
 
The ICCPR provides for civil and political rights. It entails several 
provisions attempting to tackle discrimination (see Articles 2(1); 3; and 26) 
but – except for an arguable case in parts of Article 26, which obliges States 
Parties to “guarantee (…) equal and effective protection against 
discrimination” based on sex – academics such as Brad Roth have argued 
that the Covenant mostly employs an approach of formal equality, providing 
men and women with the same rights and the same enforcement of those 
rights.85 Noteworthy is Article 23 on family, which provides that “[t]he 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State” (Article 23(1)), while also noting that 
“[t]he right of men and women of marriageable age to marry and to found a 
family shall be recognized” (Article 23(2)) and obliging States Parties to 
                                                
84 Article 1(3) prohibits discrimination based on “race, sex, language or religion”. 
85 Brad R Roth, ‘The CEDAW as a Collective Approach to Women’s Rights’, (2002-3) 24 
Michigan Journal of International Law 187, 191. Note that the notion of formal equality 
will be elaborated upon further in chapter four’s discussion of CEDAW’s definition of 
equality, see below chapter 4.1.3. 
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“take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of 
spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution” (Article 
23(4)). ICCPR’s counter-part, the ICESCR, provides for economic, social 
and cultural rights. It equally contains an anti- (sex) discrimination 
provision in Article 2(2), and a provision for the equal enjoyment of rights 
of men and women in Article 3. However, the ICESCR has also been 
criticized for being built on men’s life experiences.86 Hilary Charlesworth 
argues that the ICESCR assumes all power vests with the state, not 
acknowledging that women’s indirect subjection to the state’s power is 
filtered through their direct subjection to the power of individual men or 
groups of men.87 Charlesworth concludes: “The Covenant, then, does not 
touch on the economic, social, and cultural context in which most women 
live”.88 
 
In addition to the (limited) provisions contained in these instruments, the 
development of women’s human rights was simultaneously occurring on 
other fronts. The CSW, a UN Charter body at first operating as a sub-
commission of the Commission on Human Rights and from 1946 onwards 
as a separate Commission of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), 
was given the responsibility to work for the promotion of women’s rights.89 
The CSW was, inter alia, responsible for the drafting of conventions such as 
the Convention on Consent of Marriage, Minimum Age for Marriage and 
Registration of Marriage of 1962.90 
 
In their commentary on CEDAW, Christine Chinkin and Marsha Freeman 
argue that it became apparent by the 1960s that, notwithstanding the 
principle of non-discrimination in regard to women’s enjoyment of their 
rights as contained in the UN Charter and the UDHR, discrimination against 
women persistently continued to exist. 91 Demands for a stronger and better-
suited human rights approach for women then lead to the adoption of the 
non-binding Declaration on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women in 1967 (DEDAW). DEDAW, following the general structure of the 
UDHR, had been drafted by the CSW and debated in the UN General 
Assembly’s Third Committee.92 In 1972, the CSW further pressured for an 
“International Women’s Year”, which then took place in 1975 and included 
the First UN World Conference on Women, carried out in Mexico City. 
Delegations at the Conference expressed support for the CSW’s view that 
the time had come for a legally-binding instrument on women’s human 
rights and further supported its drafting efforts of such Convention that had 
                                                
86 Here, Charlesworth draws on the work of Shelley Wright, see: Hilary Charlesworth, 
‘What are ‘Women’s International Human Rights’?’ in Rebecca J. Cook, Human Rights of 
Women: National and International Perspectives (University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) 
58, 59. 
87 Ibid., 74. 
88 Ibid. 
89 Chinkin and Freeman (n 11) 4. 
90 Ibid., 4-5. 
91 Ibid., 5. 
92 Ibid. 
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begun in 1974 and that would eventually lead to the adoption of CEDAW.93 
Negotiations took place in the CSW and within various working groups of 
the UN General Assembly’s Third Committee before CEDAW was finally 
adopted on December 18 in 1979. It entered into force on September 3 
1980, thirty days after the twentieth State had submitted its instrument of 
accession.94 As of February 21, 2015, 188 States have become States Party 
to the Convention, 95 rendering it the second most widely ratified UN human 
rights convention, after the Convention on the Rights of the Child. 
3.2 Substance of CEDAW 
3.2.1 CEDAW’s Structure 
While the Convention itself is divided into six untitled parts, Chinkin and 
Freeman suggest an alternative division for the purpose of understanding the 
Convention and its application.96 This is: the structure of CEDAW can 
generally be described as being divided into the preamble and three main 
parts. The preamble acknowledges that despite existing non-discrimination 
and equality provisions in other international human rights instruments, 
discrimination continues to exist and recalls that discrimination against 
women inter alia “hampers the growth of the prosperity of society and the 
family”. It further specifically mentions the need for a change in tradition 
regarding the roles of women and men in society and the family in order to 
achieve full equality between the sexes. 
 
The first main part of the Convention (Articles 1-5) can be understood as 
formulating general obligations and forming an interpretive basis for the 
more substantive Articles of the Convention. These are contained in the 
second part (Articles 6-16), covering “the suppression of traffic in women 
and of the exploitation of prostitution of women” (Article 6); the abolition 
of discrimination against women in political and public life, including at the 
international level (Articles 7 and 8); in nationality laws and regulations 
(Article 9); in education (Article 10); in employment and work in the formal 
and informal labour market sectors (Article 11); in health care (Article 12); 
in all areas of economic and social life (Article 13); in women’s legal 
capacity (Article 15); and in marriage and family relations (Article 16)”97. 
The particular struggle rural women face in the discrimination against them 
is dealt with in Article 14. The third part of the Convention, Articles 17-22 
institute CEDAW’s monitoring mechanism inter alia setting out the 
composition and mandate of the CEDAW Committee. The fourth part, 
                                                
93 Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling and Cees Flinterman (eds), The Circle of Empowerment: 
Twenty-Five Years of the UN Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against 
Women (The Feminist Press at the University of New York 2007) 11.  
94 The country was St Vincent and the Grenadines: Chinkin and Freeman (n 11) 7. 
95 United Nations Treaty Collection (status at 09 May 2015) 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
8&chapter=4&lang=en> accessed 09 May 2015. 
96 Chinkin and Freeman (n 11) 8. 
97 Ibid., 23. 
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comprising of Articles 23-30 contain administrative and final provisions and 
are less important for the purposes of this thesis.  
3.2.2 CEDAW’s Special Characteristics 
In terms of the substance of CEDAW, commentators have identified several 
features that are set out to reach the realities of discrimination against 
women and that render the Convention “innovative”98, at least when placing 
it historically. The first of those features is that CEDAW covers social, 
economic and cultural rights as well as civil and political rights and places 
those two (traditionally often separated) branches of human rights law under 
a common normative framework of non-discrimination and equality 
between women and men. Another ‘innovate’ characteristic derives from 
CEDAW’s provisions obliging States to abolish and modify social and 
cultural attitudes, norms and practices that discriminate against women. As 
argued by Brad Roth, this creates collective norms within CEDAW and 
therefore breaks with the liberal individualistic approach that instruments 
such as the ICCPR have taken in their focus on specific acts of 
discrimination rather than underlying conditions.99 This characteristic is 
especially evident in provisions such as Article 5, which inter alia provides 
for the modification of discriminatory patterns and stereotypes.  
 
In relation to this, importantly, stands another feature, namely that CEDAW 
obliges States Parties not only to respect its norms in their laws, policies and 
practices but also “like the earlier [International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination] it extends the 
understanding of human rights by requiring the State party to prevent or 
impose sanctions on acts of discrimination by non-State (private) actors, 
including within the family, the community, and the commercial sector”100. 
Further, the Convention allows for special measures. One type of special 
measure aims to create equality in situations which are specific to women 
due to their biology, for instance, women’s ability to give birth (see Article 
4(2)). Another type is that of temporary special measures that seem to 
privilege women only but are aimed at creating de facto equality between 
women and men. Such measures are to be discontinued once “the objectives 
of equality of opportunity and treatment have been achieved” (Article 4(1)).   
3.3 The CEDAW Committee 
3.3.1 Establishment and Composition of the 
Committee 
Article 17 of the Convention establishes the CEDAW Committee as its 
treaty body, rendering it responsible for the monitoring of the 
implementation of CEDAW into national systems. The provision provides 
                                                
98 Ibid., 16.  
99 Roth (n 8) 192. 
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for the CEDAW Committee to consist of twenty-three experts (Article 
17(1)).101 While the members of the Committee are elected on a four-year 
term by States Parties from a list of candidates nominated by States Parties 
(Article 17(2)), the experts are said to be independent in that they serve their 
mandate in their personal capacity (Article 17(1)). Members have to declare 
their independence upon their election and re-election,102 however, 
commentators have questioned the extent of the effectiveness of experts’ 
independence, given that CEDAW’s provisions do not provide for 
incompatibility criteria, such as work in a governmental capacity.103 Further, 
Hanna Beate Schöpp-Schilling has commented that “there have been 
instances when pronouncements on States Parties Reports by some experts 
sounded remarkably like their governments’ official policies, although of 
course these statements may also have been completely in accordance with 
their own beliefs”104.  
 
Article 17 further requires experts to be of “high moral standing and 
competence in the field” and that the election should give consideration to 
the diversity of experts. That is to say, the provision requires both “equitable 
geographic distribution”, reflecting the geographical variety of CEDAW’s 
States Parties, as well as different “forms of civilisation” and “principle 
legal systems”, reflecting different stages of development, different cultures, 
as well as political and legal systems.105 It has been noted that the CEDAW 
Committee is the only UN human rights treaty body that has been 
dominated by women, with only three men serving as experts until 2010. 
However, the expert positions have been occupied by women (and men) 
from various professional disciplines and personal backgrounds.106  
3.3.2 The Committee’s Mandate and Fuctions 
The Committee’s mandate reaches over several monitoring and interpretive 
functions, although the effectiveness of those functions has been questioned, 
in particular in its early years and before the adoption of the Additional 
Protocol in October 1999.107  
 
As the only monitoring procedure flowing from the text of the Convention 
itself, Article 18 establishes a reporting procedure, common to other UN 
human rights treaties, obliging States Parties to submit regular reports to the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations for consideration by the 
Committee. The reports which States Parties ought to submit within one 
year of the entry into force of CEDAW in regard to the specific State, and at 
a four year basis thereafter, as well as at request of the Committee, ought to 
                                                
101 Before the ratification of or accession to CEDAW, Article 17(1) dictated the Committee 
to exist of eighteen members. 
102 Rules of Procedure 15. 
103 Ineke Boerefin, ‘Article 17’ in Freeman, Chinkin, and Rudolf (n 11)481. 
104 Schöpp-Schilling and Flinterman (n 93) 250. 
105 Ibid., 249. 
106 Ibid., 249-50. 
107 For instance, see generally, Elizabeth Evatt, ‘Finding a Voice for Women’s Rights: The 
Early Days of CEDAW’ (2002-3) 34 George Washington International Law Review 515.  
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cover legislative, judicial, administrative and other measures taken by the 
State in order to fulfil the provisions of CEDAW as well as the progress 
made in this respect as provided for by Article 18(1). Article 18(2) further 
provides that “[r]eports may indicate factors and difficulties affecting the 
degree of fulfilment of obligations under the (…) Convention”. In its first 
session in 1982 and its second session in 1983, the Committee adopted its 
Rules of Procedures and Guidelines for States Parties in their reporting 
respectively, both of which have subsequently been amended and extended 
on several occasions.108  
 
The Committee, in trying to overcome the restraints of Article 20(1), which 
imposes limits of the frequency and length of Committee meetings, has 
established a practice of splitting up in smaller groups that prepare for the 
dialogue with States Parties in pre-sessions several months before the 
meeting. As preparation and on the basis of their reports and other available 
information, such as shadow reports by civil society, the sub-groups create a 
list of questions to be sent to and answered by the States Party under review 
before the next session.109 The dialogue with the States Parties’ delegations 
at the session has been described as “constructive”.110 The Concluding 
Comments, which the Committee drafts and subsequently adopts in a closed 
meeting, are usually structured in a way so as to firstly acknowledge the 
achievements the State Party has made in regard its fulfilment of CEDAW’s 
obligations, secondly describe concerns thereto and lastly provide 
recommendations.111 This reporting procedure is subject to analysis in 
chapter seven of the study. There it is looked at the dialogue between the 
Committee and Germany. 
 
The mandate of the Committee further provides for the right of the 
Committee to formulate suggestions and general recommendations (Article 
21(1). While suggestions are ordinarily directed to UN organs, general 
recommendations are directed at States Parties. After initial disagreement on 
whether Article 21(1) provided the Committee with the ability to formulate 
interpretations of Articles of CEDAW, and latter advice by the UN 
Secretariat in regard to this end, the Committee finally started adopting 
general recommendations in 1986.112 Since then the Committee has adopted 
29 general recommendations, interpreting the Convention.113 Of special 
importance for the purposes of the present analysis have been the 
Committee’s general recommendations on violence against women (No. 12 
and 19), equality in marriage and family relations (No. 21), the core 
obligations of States Parties under Article 2 of CEDAW (No. 28), and on 
Article 16 in regard to economic consequences of marriage, family relations 
                                                
108 Schöpp-Schilling and Flinterman (n 93)  251. 
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110 Evatt (n 107) 530. 
111 Schöpp-Schilling and Flinterman (n 93) 253-4. 
112 Ibid., 255. 
113 See for a full list of the general recommendations, CEDAW Committee, ‘General 
Recommendations’ (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights) 
<http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cedaw/comments.htm> accessed 09 May 2015. 
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and their dissolution (No. 29). These will be under scrutiny in chapters four 
to seven.  
 
It should, however, be noted that general recommendations or general 
comments of treaty bodies (such as those of the CEDAW Committee) do 
not enjoy a formal legal status and are not legally binding on states.114 It 
may therefore be argued that states will be the final interpreter of CEDAW’s 
provisions. While the precise status or influence of general 
recommendations may be subject to debate, they are undeniably of 
significance. For instance, other international and national bodies have 
referred to them as authoritative.115 On the other hand, states such as the UK 
and the USA have “rejected the idea that the Committee is ‘the’ 
authoritative interpreter of the Covenant” (here in relation to the Human 
Rights Committee and the ICCPR).116 The non-binding status of general 
recommendations may therefore decelerate but not stop the Committee’s 
ventures: “Using general [recommendations] to break new grounds to 
[strengthen the effectiveness of human rights treaties] can be a risky 
undertaking but may overtime be vindicated if a sufficient number of 
relevant actors subscribe to the treaty bodies’ position, which in turn 
generates momentum to follow.”117   
 
The Optional Protocol to CEDAW, which came into force on 22 December 
2000 after receiving its tenth ratification118, expanded the Committee’s 
mandate to include two further monitoring mechanisms.  This is to say, it 
firstly established a Communications Procedure (Article 2) under which 
individuals and groups of individuals subject to the jurisdiction of State 
Parties to the Protocol may submit complaints to the CEDAW Committee, 
and which provides the CEDAW Committee with the competence to receive 
and consider such Communications (Article 1). The CEDAW Committee 
may then adopt (non-binding) views and recommendations.119 The Protocol 
further established an Inquiry Procedure under which “allows the 
Committee to initiate a confidential investigation by one or more of its 
members where it has received reliable information of grave or systematic 
violations by a State Party of rights established in the Convention” (Article 
8). 
 
The findings of the present chapter show that the understanding of the need 
to address the specific discrimination against women in the human rights 
                                                
114 See Ilias Bantekas and Lutz Oette, International Human Rights Law and Practice (CUP 
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context led to several innovative features of CEDAW. These include the 
obligation of states to address underlying conditions that foster 
discrimination against women, as well as the reach of CEDAW into the 
family and private sphere. In how far these features are able to reach 
conditions underlying intersecting forms of discrimination will be subject to 
analysis in the following chapters. The present chapter also described the 
different tasks the Committee is burdened with under its mandate to monitor 
the implementation of CEDAW. The following chapters will, in this regard, 
interrogate the Committee’s functions to adopt general recommendations 
and engage in the reporting procedure.  
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4 CEDAW’s Definition of 
Discrimination 
Having understood the purpose, construction, and monitoring mechanisms 
of the Convention as such, this chapter moves to the analysis CEDAW’s 
definition of discrimination against women. In answering the question of 
whether CEDAW’s family-related provisions provide equal protection to 
LBQ and heterosexual women, the meaning of discrimination against 
women is of vital importance. This is the case as it determines upon which 
basis and in which field discrimination against women falls under the scope 
of CEDAW. It therefore also heavily influences the subject and scope of 
Article 16 of CEDAW, which is analysed in chapter five below. The current 
chapter starts by looking at the subject and scope of the text of Article 1 of 
CEDAW and then moves on to consider the Committee’s interpretation 
thereof.  
4.1 The Subject and Scope of Article 1 
Providing the definition of “discrimination against women”, CEDAW’s 
Article 1 is essential for mapping the scope of CEDAW’s provisions, and 
beyond, in regard to women in diverse sexual relations. Article 1 provides: 
 
“For the purposes of the present Convention, the term ‘discrimination 
against women’ shall mean any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on 
the basis of sex which has the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying 
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by women, irrespective of their 
marital status, on a basis of equality of men and women, of human rights 
and fundamental freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural, civil 
or any other field.” 
4.1.1 ‘on the basis of sex’ 
As stated in Article 1, for a distinction, exclusion or restriction to qualify as 
discriminatory under CEDAW, it needs to be based on sex, and have a 
negative impact on a woman’s enjoyment of her human rights. While the 
term ‘sex’ may be subject to interpretation, it ought to be noted that the 
definition of discrimination is based only on sex, rather than on an 
intersectional definition, focusing explicitly also on intersections between 
sex and other categories such as race, ethnicity, or sexuality/sexual 
orientation.120  
 
By appearing to focus solely on sex, the Convention effectively applies an 
essentialist and universalist approach, reducing the complex oppression of, 
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and discrimination against, women to their sex as the decisive factor, 
assuming that all women victims of human rights abuses experience these in 
the same way.121 As described by Johanna E. Bond, “essentialism precludes 
a complex analysis of the self that recognizes the intersection of, inter alia, 
racism, classism, sexism, and heterosexism in peoples' lives”.122 Bond 
further argues that the entire UN human rights system precludes 
intersectional analyses of discrimination, having created several 
Conventions that focus on different grounds of discrimination without 
meaningful intersection of these factors: “The structure of the treaty-based 
system within the United Nations has thus itself contributed to a fractured 
understanding of the nature of discrimination, failing to recognize it as an 
often inextricable mixture of factors, including race, ethnicity, religion, 
gender, class, and sexual orientation.”123  
 
Such a fractured understanding of discrimination does not account for the 
fact that LBQ women’s family-related human rights may not be violated 
because the subject is a woman and then again discriminated against 
because of the non-heterosexual sexual orientation of the subject, but are 
instead often discriminated against because the subject is a non-heterosexual 
woman. Such discrimination may be motivated by compounded gender 
stereotypes. For instance, in a case concerning adoption, the European Court 
of Human Rights ruled that the homosexuality of the applicant had 
influenced the refusal of her adoption application.124 A reading of the case 
that is sensitive to gender stereotypes further shows that compounded 
gender stereotypes were at play when discriminating against the woman: the 
public officials were motivated by a stereotypical understanding of good 
motherhood, an intrinsic element of which was heterosexuality.125 
 
Moreover, since there currently exists no Convention expressly dealing with 
discrimination based on sexual orientation, LBQ women are left with no 
express remedy for discrimination they face based on their sexual 
orientation.126 Even though CEDAW’s definition of discrimination focuses 
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on sex and therefore should not presume the subject’s sexual orientation, 
that sexed subject is not born into a social vacuum and, as described by 
Butler, is forced into the heterosexual matrix. It is therefore even more 
urgent to analyse whether CEDAW’s substantial provisions are phrased 
around the lives of heterosexual women, as will be done in chapter five. 
4.1.2 ‘irrespective of their marital status’ 
Article 1 further states that practices will be considered discriminatory 
irrespective of a woman’s marital status. Despite the criticism posed above, 
this statement included in the definition of discrimination against women 
indeed appears to take into account diversity amongst women, though to a 
limited extent. It appears that the drafters’ intentions had been to ensure that 
single mothers were to be protected and could not be discriminated against 
based on that ground.127 While of importance for the lives of heterosexual 
women, who often were discriminated against based on their status as 
unmarried, the narrative of the drafting of this term is therefore heterosexual 
and hence marginalizes equally important discrimination faced by women in 
same-sex relationships. 
 
If interpreted broadly, however, the reference to marital status could 
potentially have an impact on the scope of the Convention in terms of its 
protection on women in same-sex relationships. As explained by Andrew 
Byrnes in his commentary on Article 1, the phrase,  
 
“could protect married women against discrimination on the ground of 
their marital status as compared to women who are not married, as well 
as by comparison with married men. Conversely, it could protect women 
who are not married from being discriminated against on that basis, both 
as regards men who are not married and women who are married. If the 
phrase extended this far, the Convention would in effect cover marital 
status discrimination between different categories of women, as well as 
discriminatory treatment clearly based on sex between the categories of 
married/unmarried women and married/unmarried men”128.  
 
Such interpretation could allow non-married women in same-sex 
relationships to claim that they are discriminated against in comparison with 
married women in different-sex relationships. However, even if interpreted 
broadly, the fact remains true that it would be an attempt to fit non-
heterosexual women into protection that has been created specifically for 
heterosexual women, instead of an initial creation of norms that take into 
                                                
127 Byrnes notes that the addition of this formulation to the draft was partly based on a 
proposal to include in Article 16 that unmarried mothers and children of unmarried parents 
are not be discriminated against based on that ground: Andrew Byrnes, ‘Article 1’ in in 
Freeman, Chinkin, and Rudolf (n 11) 59; and Working Group of the Whole on the Drafting 
of the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘Draft Convention 
on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’ (1978) A/C.3/33/L.47/Add.2, paras 
258-62. 
128 Byrnes (n 127) 51, 61. 
 33 
account different identities of women. A non-heteronormative approach that 
would have taken into account varying forms of (homo-, bi-, heterosexual or 
queer) families, while exposing that marriage is a social construct rather 
than the natural form of family, would have been phrased in a way that does 
not put the focus on marriage. 
4.1.3 ‘on a basis of equality of men and women’ 
While on the face of it the reference to “equality of men and women” in 
Article 1 seems to point towards a sameness approach to equality (women 
should get what men are already entitled to), this is not necessarily the case. 
As has been pointed out by several scholars129, the scope of this phrase 
within the definition of “discrimination against women” depends on one’s 
approach to equality. This section will offer a brief overview over three 
approaches to equality (though more exist) in order to enable an 
understanding of the scope created by the Committee as well as the future 
potential thereof.  
 
A sole formal equality approach, which “embodies the presumption that 
equality means that all persons are to be treated identically, and a failure to 
do so amounts to discrimination or denial of equality”130, would of course 
overlook legislation, practices etc. that discriminate against women 
indirectly, as was the case with the UDHR. 
 
Substantive equality, on the other hand, refers to the actual impact laws have 
on their subjects and may require differential treatment in order to achieve 
de facto equality between men and women.131 Yet, the substantial equality 
approach is still based upon a comparison between what men (already) 
factually have and what women therefore deserve to receive. And, as Byrnes 
notes further “[o]bligations to avoid indirect discrimination are generally 
qualified by the existence of exceptions based on justifiability or 
reasonableness that reflect prevailing social arrangements. This approach, 
therefore, tends to leave intact social and institutional structures that are 
exclusionary and based on androcentric assumption models”132. 
 
The third approach is that of transformative equality, which requires a 
transformation of social structures of hierarchy, oppression and 
subordination that are based on gender and sex for true equality to be 
achieved.133 Byrnes argues that this form of equality could be seen as 
substantive equality that also expands to structural dimensions.134  
 
A point should be added to the model of transformative equality, as the 
model described above only takes into account hierarchical structures based 
                                                
129 For instance, see Byrnes (n 127) 61. 
130 Ibid., 53.  
131 Ibid., 54. 
132 Ibid., 55.  
133 Ibid., 55.  
134 Ibid., 55.  
 34 
on sex and gender. This fails to see the interdependency of patriarchy and 
heteronormativity. It is my argument, therefore, that a transformative 
equality model employed by the Committee must to be restructured to 
require transformation of social structures of hierarchy, oppression and 
subordination that are based on sex, gender, and sexual orientation (and 
their intersections) for true equality to be achieved.  
4.1.4 ‘or any other field’ 
As stated above, for a distinction, exclusion or restriction to qualify as 
discriminatory under CEDAW it ought to impair or nullify a woman’s 
enjoyment of her human rights and fundamental freedoms. That is, as stated 
in the Convention, not only in the political, economic, social, cultural, and 
civil fields but also in “any other field”. The earlier draft by the CSW had 
instead stated “any other field of public life”.135  This reference was later 
removed following suggestions from Portugal136, UNESCO137, and the 
International Federation of University Women,138 with the aim of extending 
CEDAW’s protection to the domestic sphere. This, as previously addressed 
in chapters one and three, was of great importance as it allowed CEDAW’s 
scope to reach the vast forms of discrimination that women suffer in the 
private sphere and which the previous UN human rights conventions did not 
address. Acknowledging the domestic sphere to be one field in which 
discrimination against women can exist under CEDAW allows the current 
analysis of the acknowledgment of intersecting forms of discrimination 
within this field. It is also of importance here that the definition, and 
therefore the scope, of discrimination against women under CEDAW is not 
limited to the rights set forth in the Convention itself, but also extends to 
other recognized human rights.139  
 
From the above it seems clear that an analysis of discrimination against 
women based on sexual orientation was not a matter of concern when 
CEDAW emerged. It is however not the case that sexual orientation did not 
at all play a role in the creation of this definition; a heterosexual woman can, 
in many places, be found as the proper subject of Article 1 (heterosexuality 
being one form of sexual orientation). Her experiences seem to be treated as 
the norm, deviating the specific discrimination non-heterosexual women 
may face. Despite these findings, the section further identified factors that 
either enable or hinder a present or future inclusion of intersectional 
discrimination within the scope of Article 1. The main factor that hinders 
the inclusion of discrimination specifically directed against LBQ women is 
of course the apparent essentialist view of women, with Article 1 lacking 
any reference to intersectional forms of discrimination. However, other 
factors could enable the Committee and states to include intersectional 
discrimination against LBQ women in their interpretation of Article 1 of 
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CEDAW. Such factors include possibilities for a wide interpretation of the 
term ‘sex’, so as to include gender and sexual orientation, as well as the 
phrase ‘irrespective of marital status’, so as to allow for diverse forms of 
comparisons between married and non-married women and men. The 
specific approach of equality adopted further influences the ability of Article 
1 to include the specific discrimination LBQ women may face. The 
Committee’s interpretive work in this respect will be subject to analysis in 
the following section. 
4.2 The Committee’s Interpretation  
Considering the limitations of CEDAW’s definition of discrimination, as 
well as its hindering and enabling factors as identified above, this section 
addresses how the Committee has dealt with the realty of discrimination 
LBQ women face as LBQ women. Of special importance in this regard is 
that the general recommendations looked upon in this section were adopted 
by the Committee within the past eleven years and therefore were born in a 
context in which the feminist and queer discourses that form the basis for 
the current study were widely known or available. Furthermore, the 
addressing of particular struggles of LBQ women in relation to human rights 
law had taken shape on an international basis, not least through the 
Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights 
Law in relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity in 2006140. The 
discourse on women’s rights and the pitfalls of essentialism had therefore 
evolved enormously since the adoption of CEDAW in 1979. 
 
In its general recommendation no. 28, adopted more than thirty years after 
the birth of CEDAW, the Committee addresses the Convention’s reference 
to sex-based discrimination.141 The Committee defines sex as “biological 
differences between men and women” and gender as “socially constructed 
identities, attributes and roles for women and men and society’s social and 
cultural meaning for these biological differences resulting in hierarchical 
relationships between women and men and in the distribution of power and 
rights favouring men and disadvantaging women.”142 It also clarifies that the 
scope of the Convention covers gender-based discrimination against 
women, 143 though it does not seem to include sexual orientation within its 
concept of gender-based discrimination as such. Instead, the Committee 
addresses sexual orientation as an intersecting factor:  
 
                                                
140 Yogyakarta Principles (n 24). 
141 CEDAW Committee ‘General Recommendation No. 28’ (2010) CEDAW/C/GC/28, 
para 5. Note that this general recommendation is concerned with the core obligations of 
States parties under Article 2 of CEDAW.  
142 Ibid., para 5. 
143 The Committee arrives at this conclusion by interpreting Article 1 together with Articles 
2(f), which provides for the States parties’ obligation to undertake “appropriate measures, 
including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations, customs and practices 
which constitute discrimination against women”, and Article 5(a), which concerns 
stereotyping: See Ibid., para 5. 
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“The discrimination of women based on sex and gender is inextricably 
linked with other factors that affect women, such as race, ethnicity, 
religion or belief, health, status, age, class, caste and sexual orientation 
and gender identity. Discrimination on the basis of sex or gender may 
affect women belonging to such groups to a different degree or in 
different ways to men. States parties must legally recognize such 
intersecting forms of discrimination and their compounded negative 
impact on the women concerned and prohibit them. They also need to 
adopt and pursue policies and programmes designed to eliminate such 
occurrence.”144  
 
In the same general recommendation, the Committee further recognises that 
“[c]ertain groups of women, including (…) lesbian women (…) are 
particularly vulnerable to discrimination through civil and penal laws, 
regulations and customary law and practices”145. It therefore acknowledges 
certain forms of specific discrimination lesbian women face and seems to 
place those within the scope of Article 1 and the Convention generally. 
Though one might wonder why the Committee first lists sexual orientation 
as a potential intersectional factor and later deals only with lesbian women. 
Lastly, the Committee has requested in its Reporting Guidelines that States 
parties submit information on the “implementation of the Convention with 
respect to different groups of women, in particular those subject to multiple 
forms of discrimination”146. 
 
Such acknowledgments and clarifications are an important step in expressly 
and effectively extending the scope of CEDAW to protect women in same 
sex relationships from discrimination. They also move away from an 
essentialist view of women, no longer assuming that all women experience 
human rights abuses in the same ways, and at the same time seem to move 
towards an understanding of Article 1 envisioned by tan beng hui. In asking 
whether CEDAW’s framework allows for protection of a woman’s right to 
determine and control her sexuality, tan beng hui notes that CEDAW’s 
underlying principles of substantive equality, non-discrimination, and state 
obligation have allowed the Convention to be extended beyond its literal 
text: “In this manner, the CEDAW Committee has been – and continues to 
be – able to address matters that fall under the ambit of sexuality rights.”147 
She notes that nothing within CEDAW prevents the Committee from 
acknowledging sexuality rights, including sexual orientation, under 
CEDAW148 and that based on Article 1, women who are discriminated 
against because of their sexuality can in theory claim protection under 
CEDAW if they can show that such discrimination “has been used to 
                                                
144 para 18. While GC is on Article 2, it also clarifies the scope of Article 1. 
145 para 31. 
146 CEDAW Committee Decision 40/I, ‘Convention Specific Reporting Guidelines of the 
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women’, (2008) A/63/38 (Supp) 
part I, Annex I, para 21. 
147 tan beng hui, Exploring the potential of the UN Treaty Body System in Addressing 
Sexuality Rights (International Women’s Rights Action Watch Asia Pacific Occasional 
Paper Series, No 11, 2007) 7. 
148 Ibid., 11. 
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subordinate women and reinforce male superiority”.149 This goes hand in 
hand with the understanding of patriarchy and heteronormativity being 
intrinsically linked, as described earlier (see above, chapter 2.3). One 
example of how the oppression of non-heterosexual women can be framed 
as a matter of reinforcing male superiority is the practice of ‘corrective rape’ 
as it occurs, inter alia, in South Africa.150 Thereby men rape lesbian women 
in order to ‘cure’ their lesbianism. They hence oppress lesbian women by 
exercising rape with the aim of bringing them under the control (sexual and 
otherwise) of men. This issue of violence against LBQ women will be 
further investigated in chapter six below. 
 
Another important consideration is as to the Committee’s approach to 
equality, fearing that a model of equality that relies heavily on a comparison 
between the rights men have and the rights women have would once again 
deviate non-heterosexual women, as the rights of men too have been centred 
around heterosexual lives and experiences. The Committee seems to have 
adopted a fluid approach.151 For instance, in general recommendation 28, 
the Committee seems to reject an understanding of Article 1 as referring to 
formal equality only: “This would mean that an identical or neutral 
treatment of women and men might constitute discrimination against 
women if such treatment resulted in or had the effect of women being 
denied the exercise of a right because there was no recognition of the pre-
existing gender-based disadvantage and inequality that women face.”152 In 
general recommendation no. 25, which was adopted in 2004, the Committee 
further addresses the necessity of transformative equality to achieve de facto 
equality between men and women: “The position of women will not be 
improved as long as the underlying causes of discrimination against women, 
and of their inequality, are not effectively addressed. The lives of women 
and men must be considered in a contextual way, and measures adopted 
towards a real transformation of opportunities, institutions and systems so 
that they are no longer grounded in historically determined male paradigms 
of power and life patterns.”153 
 
Bond, writing before the adoption of general recommendations 25 and 28, 
criticized the opinion of other commentators, who argued that the 
Committee had adopted a substantive approach to equality and countered 
that, with a few exceptions, the Convention did not consider intersectional 
discrimination.154 It appears, though, that the Committee has now taken into 
account diversity amongst women to some extent and has started its way to 
a more meaningful understanding of equality. This could lead to a move 
                                                
149 Ibid., 8. 
150 CEDAW Committee, Concluding Observations South Africa (2011) 
CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 paras 39-40. 
151 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 29’ (2013) CEDAW/C/GC/29, 
para 8: “The Committee has consistently concluded that the elimination of discrimination 
against women requires States parties to provide for substantive as well as formal equality.” 
152 CEDAW/C/GC/28, para 5. 
153 CEDAW Committee,’ General Recommendation No. 25’ (2004) contained in UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, para 10.  
154 Bond (n 121) 96-7. 
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away from the form of equality described and criticized by Dianne Otto: 
“The unidimensional paradigm of gender equality promotes the uncritical 
embrace of the inequitable foundations of the status quo despite purporting 
to create emancipatory alternatives for women”155. The Committee’s 
statements seem to also move closer to the understanding of discrimination 
against women envisioned by tan beng hui. However, there is a real need for 
consistency in the Committee’s understanding of equality and non-
discrimination. An intersectional understanding of discrimination should not 
only be employed in designated sections but should flow through every step 
of the Committee’s work. If intersectionality is only sometimes 
incorporated, or if LBQ women are only mentioned through the occasional 
section specifically designated to LBQ women, the experiences of LBQ 
women would be further marginalized and the created norm of heterosexual 
women would be reinforced while its structures would remaining largely 
invisible.  
 
This chapter has shown that the text and drafting of Article 1 were not in 
themselves concerned with aspects of sexual orientation. However, 
especially in recent years, the Committee has made important steps towards 
an intersectional approach to the definition of discrimination against 
women. This approach, inter alia, takes into account the sexual orientation 
of women. The Committee has been able make such steps through certain 
enabling factors of Article 1, such as the room for various approaches to 
equality. As has been discussed, there is a need for consistency as to the 
inclusion of such line in regard to the other provisions of CEDAW. The 
question whether the Committee has in fact shown consistency will form 
part of the investigation in the following chapters. 
                                                
155 Dianne Otto, ‘Holding up Half the Sky, but for Whose Benefit: A Critical Analysis of 
the Fourth World Conference on Women’ (1996) 6 Australian Feminist Law Journal 7, 12. 
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5 Family and the Construct of 
Marriage under CEDAW 
Having explored CEDAW’s definition of discrimination, and the 
Committee’s current interpretation thereof, this chapter moves on to 
investigate the Convention’s family-related provisions in the light of my 
analytical strategy. Through identifying in which areas of family life 
CEDAW seeks to eliminate discrimination against women, and what 
CEDAW presupposes about women, this chapter forms a core part of the 
study. The chapter starts by describing the form and content of the 
stereotypical or normal family. Article 16 of CEDAW, concerning family 
life and marriage, is then scrutinised closely. Firstly, in regard to its text and 
drafting and, secondly, in regard to the Committee’s interpretation thereof. 
Lastly, a few other provisions will be subject to brief discussion. 
5.1 The Stereotypical Family and its 
raison d'être 
While it has been acknowledged that family structures and dynamics are 
subject to change in time, culture and location156, there nevertheless exists a 
basic idea about the normal family, both in society and in law. In the global 
West, this family, described as the sexual family by Albertson Fineman157, 
exists in the form of a man and a woman, who maintain a sexual bond, and 
who may have one or more children. The most valued form of this unit, 
then, is its inscription in law through marriage.158 Through its existence in 
law, and the benefits attached to the form, both tangible and intangible, 
individuals may not only consider this the normal unit, but also may be, 
knowingly or unknowingly, pressured into such form, due to societal, 
economic, or religious reasons.  
 
Within the normal family, women and men have different roles, assigned, 
controlled and maintained through gender stereotypes (hence it will at times 
be referred to as ‘stereotypical family’ or ‘stereotypical heterosexual 
family’). The woman’s role as the care-taker is usually assigned less 
                                                
156 See, for instance, United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, ‘Major 
Trends Affecting Families’ (2003) 
<http://undesadspd.org/Family/Publications/MajorTrendsAffectingFamilies.aspx> accessed 
09 May 2015. This publication deals assesses changes in family structures in different 
regions across the world.   
157 Albertson Fineman (n 16) 45. 
158 Note the discussion on (heterosexual) marriage as being a necessary component of full 
and first-class citizenship and a relating discourse on whether the possibility of homosexual 
marriage is therefore a desirable goal. For instance, see Amy L. Brandzel, 'Queering 
Citizenship? Same-Sex Marriage and the State' (2005) 2 GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and 
Gay Studies 171; and Jyl Josephson, ‘Citizenship, Same-Sex Marriage, and Feminist 
Critiques of Marriage’ (2005) 3:2 Perspectives on Politics 269-84. 
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value159, while the man’s role as the bread-winner is appreciated more 
highly. Moreover, the normal family has been a site of oppression over 
women, not only in regard to women’s assigned roles as care-givers. As 
Marsha A. Freeman points out, “[i]n the name of protecting the family, 
States have supported male authority over the actions of wives, daughters, 
and other family members and over the accumulation and use of property. 
Divorce has been made extraordinarily difficult for women to initiate, and 
upon divorce women experience far greater negative financial and social 
consequences than men. Patriarchal traditions and attitudes inform laws, 
policies, and customs relating to all aspects of marriage and family life”.160 
As such the stereotypical heterosexual family also forms a basis though 
which discrimination against women has been enabled and legitimized in 
other spheres, for instance the exclusion of women from the workforce, 
education etc. 
 
The normal family and its oppressing aspects, however, do not merely exist 
in regard to the power imbalance of its two oppositely-sexed subjects. As 
stated before, it must be understood that patriarchy is inevitably linked to 
heteronormativity: “The most blatant transgression of the patriarchal female 
gender identity and her fixed gender (motherly) role is the lesbian woman 
who chooses to renounce a male sexual partner and thereby also rejects the 
protection of the male head of household and all other forms of male 
supervision and control of her life.”161 It further ought to be understood that 
the stereotypical family has different effects on women with different sexual 
orientations and family preferences. For instance, while the heterosexual 
woman who finds herself heading a heterosexual monogamous family might 
be oppressed by the stereotypical roles assigned to and expected from 
women within such unit, the homosexual woman who wishes for a 
monogamous homosexual family is not afforded the same rights as a 
heterosexual woman would be, for instance the right to marry. A queer, 
homo-, hetero-, or bisexual woman who does not wish for a monogamous 
relationship but for a more complex family model, or no (sexual) family 
model at all might then again be discriminated again by society and the law 
for deviating from the created norm.  
 
Hence, especially in regard to CEDAW, which is based on a principle of 
equality of men and women, it is vital to understand that discrimination 
against women in regard to the family is not only present in the form of 
power-imbalances within the heterosexual family and marriage, but also that 
laws and practices discriminating same-sex couples stand in direct relation 
to the inequality between men and women and men’s oppression over 
women.162 In any honest attempt to free the family from discrimination 
                                                
159 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 21’ (1994) contained in UN Doc 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, para 11. 
160 Rikki Holtmaat, ‘Article 5’ in Freeman, Chinkin and Rudolf (n 11) 414, 417. 
161 Ibid., 419.  
162 Similarly, tan beng hui argues that women’s sexuality rights, including her right to 
determine her own sexuality, fall within the scope of CEDAW, “as long as it can be shown 
how they are disadvantaged and discriminated against because of this, e.g. how has 
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against women, CEDAW therefore ought to tackle not only inequalities 
between women and men inside the stereotypical family, but also ought to 
look at how the form of the stereotypical family discriminates against 
women in same-sex relationships. Anything else would be to say that a man 
ought to be present in a family for a woman to be afforded human rights in 
relation to her family life.   
 
Having set out this prevalently Western construct of the normal family, it 
should be noted that this conceptualization of the normal family is not 
universal. For instance, as explained by Janice Wood Wetzel, “[t]he more 
traditional extended family, long the norm in many developing countries, 
consists of two or more nuclear families affiliated through parent-child 
relationships, sometimes extending for four generations”.163 The varying 
conceptualisations of the family can further be detected in ECOSOC’s failed 
attempt in 1988 and 1989 to find a definition of ‘family’ upon which all 
states would agree.164 It is important to note, however, that “[o]nly The 
Netherlands wanted to define the family as a flexible concept that would 
include other than the traditional nuclear and extended family 
constellations”.165 In regard to CEDAW, as will be seen below in the 
exploration of Article 16 on family and marriage relations, much focus is on 
the (in)equality between, and in regard to, the two partners forming the core 
of the family and in regard to their children. That the normal family was an 
operative idea in the formulation of CEDAW is further indicated through a 
careful reading of Lars Adam Rehof’s study on the travaux préparatoires of 
CEDAW. It appears that no meaningful discussion of specific aspects of 
discrimination of women in regard to the more traditional extended family 
took place as such in the drafting of Article 16.166 Merely the Byelorussian 
SSR stressed the need for a provision providing for “equal rights and 
responsibilities for fathers and mothers”167, somewhat trying to reach the 
more traditional extended family forms.168 As will be seen below, this 
suggestion was not adopted (while a similar provision on children is to be 
found in Article 16(1)(f), mirroring parental roles of the normal family).  
                                                                                                                        
sexuality been used to subordinate women and reinforce male superiority”: tan beng hui (n 
147) 8. 
163 Janice Wood Wetzel, The World of Women in Pursuit of Human Rights (Macmillan 
1993) 156. 
164 Ibid., 156. 
165 Ibid., 156-7. 
166 Lars Adam Rehof, Guide to the Travaux Préparatoires of the United Nations 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1993) 168-86. 
167 Ibid., 170. 
168 The fact that such suggestion reflects more accurately (non-Western) traditional 
extended family forms may be deducted from its similarities with Article 29 of the African 
Charter on Human and Peoples Rights as well as Article 32 of the American Convention on 
Human Rights. 
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5.2 Content, Scope, and Subject of  
Article 16 
Article 16 of CEDAW, concerning marriage and family relations, has its 
roots in Article 16 of the UDHR, which speaks of the “right to marry and to 
found a family”. However, the UDHR, despite the reference to women and 
men’s entitlement to “equal rights as to marriage”, also states that “[t]he 
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to 
protection by society and the State” (Article 16(1)), somewhat shielding the 
institution from state intervention through regulation. Freeman describes the 
language of the UDHR as presenting “a potential tension between 
traditional concepts of ‘protecting’ the family unit and the concept that 
spouses individually have ‘equal rights to marriage, during marriage, and at 
its dissolution’”.169 Unlike its parent provision, however, CEDAW omits a 
provision on the protection of the family unit and instead aims more 
rigorously at changing specific gender equality issues within marriage 
and/or the family.  
 
Then, one ought to ask oneself, does CEDAW’s omission of this provision 
mean that a natural family unit is no longer presupposed, and is the non-
heterosexual couple no longer seen as the deviant? Article 16 of CEDAW 
provides: 
 
“1. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate 
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and 
family relations and in particular shall ensure, on a basis of equality of 
men and women: (a) The same right to enter into marriage; (b) The same 
right freely to choose a spouse and to enter into marriage only with their 
free and full consent; (c) The same rights and responsibilities during 
marriage and at its dissolution; (d) The same rights and responsibilities as 
parents, irrespective of their marital status, in matters relating to their 
children; in all cases the interests of the children shall be paramount; (e) 
The same rights to decide freely and responsibly on the number and 
spacing of their children and to have access to the information, education 
and means to enable them to exercise these rights; (f) The same rights 
and responsibilities with regard to guardianship, wardship, trusteeship 
and adoption of children, or similar institutions where these concepts 
exist in national legislation; in all cases the interests of the children shall 
be paramount; (g) The same personal rights as husband and wife, 
including the right to choose a family name, a profession and an 
occupation; (h) The same rights for both spouses in respect of the 
ownership, acquisition, management, administration, enjoyment and 
disposition of property, whether free of charge or for a valuable 
consideration. 2. The betrothal and the marriage of a child shall have no 
legal effect, and all necessary action, including legislation, shall be taken 
to specify a minimum age for marriage and to make the registration of 
                                                
169 Marsha A. Freeman, ‘Article 16’ in Freeman, Chinkin, and Rudolf (n 11) 409, 411. 
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marriages in an official registry compulsory.” 
 
Several initial observations can be made based on this text. The first part of 
the chapeau is phrased in a rather general way, speaking of an eradication of 
discrimination “in all matters relating to marriage and family relations”. 
Though it puts emphasis on marriage, not least by placing it before other 
family relations, this part of Article 16 allows for room to be interpreted 
broadly by the Committee so as to enable women to live the family life they 
envision without any discrimination against them. An interpretation among 
such lines would cover forms of families that are not the normal family 
described above. Noticing the intersectional definition of “discrimination 
against women” that the Committee has put forward in recent years (see 
above, chapter four), one could indeed argue that the chapeau of Article 16 
can no longer be interpreted differently.  
 
However, the latter part of the chapeau, introducing a non-exhaustive list of 
rights in regard to marriage and family relations, instructs these rights to be 
had “on a basis of equality of men and women”. This provision, crossed 
with any understanding of equality that is less extensive than the substantive 
equality model taking into account heteropatriarchy, could be problematic 
for same-sex couples, as the exercise would require some sort of 
comparison between the rights of men and those of women. For instance, 
one ought to wonder whether Article 16(1)(a) gives women merely the right 
to marry a person of opposite sex if that is the right given to men. In that 
way Article 16(1)(a) may be qualified rather than enhanced by Article 
16(1)’s reference to the equality of men and women.  
 
Even without this reference, the provisions (a) to (h) appear mostly centred 
around the lives of women in monogamous different-sex relationships, 
rendering the subject of the provision heteronormative. The right to freely 
choose a spouse and enter into marriage with full consent (Article 16(1)(b)) 
appears to deal with different types of forced and arranged marriages 
usually concerning heterosexual marriages. Of course, forced and arranged 
marriages can also affect non-heterosexual women, who may be forced into 
marriage with a man despite, or because of, their sexual orientation.170 
Further, the right to “freely choose a spouse,” when interpreted in that way, 
could open doors for non-heterosexual relations (although, again, it may be 
qualified by the reference to equality of men and women). Provisions (c) - 
(d) and (f) concern women’s “rights and responsibilities” during marriage 
and its dissolution and in regard to children. Even though the language of 
the provisions seems to be sex-neutral, they seem to target the separated and 
unequal roles and positions of women and men within the family or 
marriage. This seems obvious due to the different roles that were/are 
assigned to women and men in the family and the hierarchy attached to such 
roles.  Provision (g) then directly refers to the husband and wife, calling for 
equality of their personal rights. The normal family often adopts the family 
                                                
170 United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights, ‘Discriminatory laws and 
practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their sexual orientation and 
gender identity’ (2011) A/HRC/19/41, para 66.  
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name of the men and women have lesser or no right to choose their 
occupation due to their role as the caretakers.  
 
Lastly, Article 16(1)(h) is concerned with ownership rights, tackling the 
issue that women often do not have ownership rights over the property of 
the family or what could be their personal property. This again is centred 
around the lives of heterosexual families, since it addresses situations in 
which only the man/husband enjoys property rights and therefore a man 
somewhat is a necessary prerequisite for the application of this provision. 
 
Article 16(2) concerns child marriage and calls for a minimum age for 
marriage as well as for compulsory registration of marriage. The latter part 
of the provision ensures that family rights of women in regard to marriage 
can actually be guaranteed by the state, but it does not mention that this 
includes same-sex marriages if they are not provided for in national law.  
 
It can be observed, then, that, even though CEDAW does not explicitly 
define the terms marriage, family and family relations, Article 16 certainly 
draws a picture of a stereotypical family unit between one man and one 
woman, in its attempt to eliminate discrimination against the woman within 
this specific unit. Certainly, an acknowledgment of the rights of women 
within such family unit, as well as resulting state obligations are of huge 
importance to many women: “[B]ecause [heterosexual] marriage remains 
the norm for the vast majority of women at some point in their lives, the 
impact on women’s lives of inequality between men and women within the 
construct of marriage is deep and broad.”171 While this may certainly be the 
case, one ought to pose the question whether CEDAW’s emphasis on 
marriage is complicit in the perpetuation of marriage as the norm.  
 
Furthermore, knowing about the connection between patriarchy and 
heteronormativity, it should be clear that merely because no man is 
necessarily present in female same-sex relationships, does not mean that 
there is no discrimination against women in regard to such unit which 
originates from patriarchy. However, the forms of discrimination against 
women in same-sex relationships, often originating from the form and/or 
exclusiveness of the normal family unit, are not directly addressed in 
Article 16. While to some extent, it can be argued that the provisions of 
Article 16 extend to women in same sex relationships, such line must 
necessarily be criticized for failing to address how Article 16 itself 
contributes to reinforcing the normal family, thereby assigning the deviant 
family. For only those same-sex couples that copy the stereotypical family 
unit would be able to make this argument. For instance, it could be argued 
that the strong focus of gay and lesbian rights movements on the right to 
marry is heavily influenced by the access to (human) rights that flow from 
                                                
171 Freeman (n 169) 411.  
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marriage, and therefore these movements often fail/forget to include the 
needs of LBQ, gay and transsexual people who do not fit into this unit.172  
 
One commentator, Stanlie M. James, describes Article 16 as a “profound 
challenge to normative systems of gender-based oppression”, having 
become a “critical site of struggle to defenders of patriarchal privilege.”173 
According to James, this struggle has expressed itself through the high 
number of reservations to CEDAW.174 While it is certainly true that 
CEDAW has suffered, and continues to suffer, from the high number of 
reservations, based on the above examination of Article 16, James’ view 
cannot be shared. Rather than to truly challenge the core of normative 
systems of gender-based oppression, Article 16 affords rights only to 
subjects that conform to the gender-normative systems in many other ways. 
Because Article 16 pretends to pose a challenge to patriarchy by addressing 
patriarchal structures within the stereotypical family, it actually legitimizes 
this unit and therefore strengthens it, despite its inherently exclusive nature.  
James argues that patriarchy employs creative ways to keep in power.175 
This is accurate in my opinion also. Only while he states that reservations 
are such creative measures, I argue that the giving up of some oppression in 
order to protect the system in a wider sense is what constitutes such creative 
measures.   
5.3 The Committee’s Interpretation and 
Consideration of Article 16 
The above considerations suggest that, while not excluding same-sex 
couples expressly, much of Article 16 is tailored around the concerns of 
women in different-sex relationships and marriages. Many factors seem to 
hinder Article 16 from being interpreted in a way so as to shift this focus. 
These hindering factors are the provisions that appear to address only 
discrimination against women within the stereotypical heterosexual family, 
such as Article 16(1)(g) calling for the “same personal rights as husband and 
wife”. However, other provisions, notably the chapeau of Article 16(1), 
seem to enable an interpretation that focuses on discrimination against 
women in relation to different forms of families. The purpose of this section 
is to investigate how the CEDAW Committee has interpreted Article 16 in 
relation to the family lives of LBQ women. In light of the factors identified, 
has an inclusion of their lives under the provisions of CEDAW been 
possible, and how far is such an inclusion desirable?  
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In answering these questions, the general recommendations produced by the 
Committee are once again looked at. There is, perhaps unsurprisingly, no 
general recommendation expressly dealing with families headed by LBQ 
women and therefore general recommendations dealing generally with 
family-related issues are consulted. The most recent general 
recommendation up to date (general recommendation no. 29) concerns 
economic consequences of marriage, family relations and their 
dissolution.176 Referring to the UDHR, it restates that “the family is the 
basic unit of society”.177 However, the Committee then defines family as a 
social, legal, economic and sometimes religious ‘construct’, explicitly 
moving away from the Declaration’s notion of the family (read: 
stereotypical family) being the natural and hence given unit of society.178 
This is an important statement that could open doors for an investigation of 
numerous aspects of the family that, by many, are considered normal and 
natural.  
 
In its general recommendation no. 28 on the core obligations of states 
parties under Article 2 of CEDAW, the Committee states that states ought to  
 
“enact legislation that prohibits discrimination in all fields of women’s 
lives under the Convention and throughout their lifespan. States parties 
have an obligation to take steps to modify or abolish existing laws, 
regulations, customs and practices which constitute discrimination 
against women. Certain groups of women, including (…) lesbian women, 
(…) are particularly vulnerable to discrimination through civil and penal 
laws, regulations and customary law and practices.”179  
 
It will be interesting to see in how far CEDAW has taken into account its 
own understanding of the particular ‘vulnerability’ of lesbian women in its 
considerations on family issues, at least in general recommendation No. 29, 
which was adopted after this consideration. Simultaneously, it ought to be 
pointed out that the word ‘vulnerability’ as used by the Committee is 
somewhat problematic. It appears to conceal the fact that LBQ women’s 
vulnerability is not inherent in women’s sexual orientation but rather created 
by LBQ women’s marginalisation. 
5.3.1 Various Forms of Families 
General recommendations no. 21180 and no. 29 deal with equality in 
marriage and family relations, and with economic consequences of 
marriage, family relations and their dissolution respectively. Both contain 
sections on ‘various form of families’ and therewith recognise that more 
forms than the stereotypical family unit exist and that such forms vary from 
state to state as well as within states. General recommendation no. 21 states 
                                                
176 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 29’ (n 151). 
177 Ibid., para 1. 
178 Ibid. 
179 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 28’ (n 141). 
180 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 21’ (n 159). 
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that, whatever form the family takes, the treatment of women in the family 
ought to accord with principles of equality and justice.181 Two main factors 
prevent this statement from extending protection sufficiently to women in 
same-sex relationships. Firstly, the Committee fails to address or even 
mention same-sex headed families expressly and therefore leaves room for 
the argument that only differences in forms of different-sex families are 
considered. Secondly, the reference to “treatment of women in the family” 
appears to mean the equality between a woman and a man in the 
heterosexual family, and therefore mirrors the heterosexual provisions of 
CEDAW without critically analysing outside intervention as to different 
forms of families based on the sexual orientation of partners.  
 
Even more stunning, perhaps, is the reference to same-sex couples under the 
same heading in general recommendation no. 29, which states: “Certain 
forms of relationships (i.e. same sex relationships) are not legally, socially 
or culturally accepted in a considerable number of States parties. However, 
where they are recognized, whether as a de facto union, registered 
partnership or marriage, the State party should ensure protection of 
economic rights of the women in these relationships [emphasis added].”182 
This statement appears to express that CEDAW does not compel states to 
accept same-sex relationships and therefore provide women in same-sex 
relationships with its protection, but rather that if, and only if, the state 
decides to recognize such families are they to be afforded with protection of 
economic rights. Whether such protection is to the same standard as that of 
women in heterosexual unions is left unmentioned. The general 
recommendations therefore seem to view Article 16(1)(a) and (b), the right 
to enter into marriage and the right to freely choose a spouse, to be 
provisions that apply to the heterosexual subject, unless the state decides to 
open it up to other subjects as well. The whole subject matter therefore is 
looked at under a heterosexual light, with general recommendation no. 21 
not considering same-sex relationships at all, while general recommendation 
no. 29 leaves it open to states whether or not to recognise same-sex unions. 
Furthermore the Committee does not involve itself in any discussion as to 
the varieties of forms of families within the category of same-sex couples 
and how some of these, i.e. those deviating in various forms from the 
heterosexual monogamous couple, may be excluded from the institution of 
marriage or other forms of recognized unions even in places where they are 
available for some same-sex couples.   
 
A lack of understanding of varieties of same-sex relationships is 
furthermore mirrored in their discussion on polygamy, which the Committee 
seems to regard as a man’s right to be married to more than one woman and 
which it therefore condemns in the name of equality of men and women.183 
Many queer families, however, do not mirror the monogamous heterosexual 
couple. Especially where children are part of the family, more than two 
adult members may belong to the unit, some of them having sexual ties with 
                                                
181 At para 13. 
182 At para 24. 
183 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 21’ (n 159) para 14. 
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one another, whereas others do not.184 A simplistic narrative that focuses on 
polygamy only in terms of a man, who may be married to more than one 
woman, denies recognition and appearance of such families and thereby 
denies them family protection under CEDAW.  
 
The Committee’s narrative surrounding marital property and inheritance is 
also centred on the problems heterosexual, and mostly married, women face, 
based on the equality with their direct male counterpart.185 The Committee 
does not, however, deal with issues that concern many same-sex couples, 
such as the distribution of property after the death of one spouse in states 
that do not acknowledge same-sex unions and once again does not take into 
account the diversity of women.  
5.3.2 Children & Family Planning 
Due to biological reasons, family planning for same-sex couples and 
different sex-couples can entail very different aspects, and mothers in same-
sex relationships may face discrimination that is directly related to their 
motherhood intersecting with their sexual orientation. The Committee has 
not yet addressed these aspects in their general recommendations. In general 
recommendation no. 21, the Committee lists reasons as to why it is vital for 
women to decide on the number and spacing of their children, this is in 
terms of the effect it can have on their rights to education, employment and 
other personal rights.186 It also speaks of the importance of voluntary 
regulation of fertility to a woman’s health, development and wellbeing.187 
These elaborations on the Convention’s Article 16(1)(e) appear to 
presuppose the sexual affiliation with a man and do not cover aspects of 
family planning that women in same-sex relationships face.188 There is 
furthermore no discussion as to whether Article 16(1)(e) can be interpreted 
in a way so as to impose an obligation not to prevent LBQ women from 
jointly having children. 
 
Legislation that discriminates against women in this way can also have a 
serious impact on their, and their children’s, family lives after dissolution of 
the relationship, union, or marriage (see below, chapter seven). If the law 
                                                
184 For instance, see Anderson-Nathe (n 172).  
185 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 21’ (n 159) paras 30-35, deals 
with women’s right to equal property during marriage and in de facto relationships and 
after their dissolution. It also deals with the division of labours within the family unit and 
women’s often non-financial contributions in discharging their household and care duties, 
as well as with inheritance rights that discriminate against the widow at the death of her 
husband or father. CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 29’ (n 151), which 
elaborates on the economic dimensions of marriage and its dissolution further, also focuses 
on the issues faced by women in heterosexual relationships, even though it addresses more 
forms of such relationships, such as registered partnerships and de facto unions.  
186 At para 21. 
187 At para 23.  
188 Also in its discussion on information for family planning, the Committee does not 
explicitly say that this should include information for family planning for same-sex 
couples: CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 24’ (1999) Contained in 
document A/54/38/Rev.1, para 28. 
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prevents both mothers from sharing custody over the child during their 
relationship (for instance through adoption), there will be no consideration 
of custody after dissolution, which can also be detrimental to the child’s best 
interests. While the CEDAW Committee has not addressed the issue of the 
best interests of the child in custody cases after divorce, the Committee on 
the Rights of the Child has stated that practices that passed the custody to 
fathers in some societies, or to the parent with greatest financial resources in 
others, did not meet the ‘best interest’ criteria.189 Arguably, it is hence not in 
the best interests of the child to not afford both women shared custody over 
their child.  
5.3.3 Recommendations on other 
Disadvantaged Groups of Women 
The CEDAW Committee has produced two general recommendations on 
specific disadvantaged groups of women. That is, firstly, general 
recommendation No. 26190 on women migrant workers, and secondly, 
general recommendation No. 27191 on older women and protection of their 
human rights. The former deals with obstacles and discrimination faced 
specifically by migrant women workers, in their country of origin, before 
departure and upon return, in the country of transit, as well as the country of 
destination. While it is of course to be welcomed that the Committee has 
with this recommendation shown a willingness and ability to place the 
specific situation of women in disadvantaged groups within CEDAW’s 
scope, and while it has within this group detected and addressed further 
forms of intersectional discrimination192, it has again left untouched the 
specific needs of LBQ women migrant workers in general, and 
discrimination relating to their families more specifically. For instance, the 
Committee addresses issues relating to family reunification, without 
addressing that same-sex couples may be placed in a particularly 
disadvantaged position in states that do not recognize same-sex unions or 
relationships. Similar issues, also left unaddressed in general 
recommendation No. 26, are family employment benefits that, in some 
states, require marriage between a man and a woman and do not recognise 
same-sex unions,193 even if they are recognised in the country of origin. 
This can leave same-sex couples in a serious economic and social 
                                                
189 Freeman (n 169) 428-9. 
190 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 26’ (2009) 
CEDAW/C/2009/WP.1/R. 
191 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 27’ (2010) 
CEDAW/C/2010/47/GC.1. 
192 In para 14, the Committee states: “Moreover, women migrant workers often experience 
intersecting forms of discrimination, suffering not only sex- and gender-based 
discrimination, but also xenophobia and racism. Discrimination based on race, ethnicity, 
cultural particularities, nationality, language, religion or other status may be expressed in 
sex- and gender-specific ways.” 
193 See, for instance, Human Rights Campaign, ‘Family and Medical Leave Act: FMLA-
Equivalent Benefit for LGBT Workers’ < http://www.hrc.org/resources/entry/family-and-
medical-leave-act-fmla-equivalent-benefit-for-lgbt-workers> accessed 09 May 2015. 
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disadvantage194 and furthermore tells a story about the exclusionary nature 
of the institution of marriage, enabling states to provides certain benefits 
only to ‘members’ of that institution. 
 
General recommendation No. 27 appears more observant as to women’s 
diverse identities. It states: “The discrimination older women experience is 
often multidimensional, with age discrimination, compounding other forms 
of discrimination based on sex, gender, ethnic origin, disability, levels of 
poverty, sexual orientation and gender identity, migrant status, marital and 
family status, literacy and other grounds.”195 In regard to the topic of 
marriage and family life, however, this revelation then disappears and the 
Committee once again falls into its often-used heterosexual rhetoric.196 
 
Overall, while making some references to same-sex couples, in its general 
recommendation the Committee has not yet made a real attempt at applying 
CEDAW’s Article 16 to same-sex couples, or to even use Article 16’s 
chapeau, perhaps in combination with Article 5, to address issues specific to 
same-sex couples or deviant families more generally. Oddly enough, even 
under an international human rights instrument that seeks to address the 
oppression of men over women, the (sexual) relation to a man still seems to 
be a pre-requisite for women to be afforded full human rights. The initial 
excitement about the Committee’s definition of the family being a construct 
and about the analyses that could flow from it, seems hampered. Rather than 
to challenge the form of the accepted construct, the Committee seems to 
address only discrimination within it.  
5.4 Other Relevant Articles 
CEDAW’s family-related provisions are not only to be found in Article 16. 
This section provides a brief investigation of some of CEDAW’s other 
provisions relating to family issues.  
 
Article 5 deals with gender stereotypes and fixed parental gender-roles and 
interacts with Article 16 heavily. Article 5(a) aims at the transformation of 
social and cultural patterns. It appears that the provision could be employed 
in a way so as to detach assigned stereotypes from men and women as well 
as to remove the attached hierarchy from such attributes. One could 
therefore argue that it indeed aims at modifying what is perceived as the 
norm. Interesting also is the evident understanding that both gender 
stereotypes of women and men need to be transformed in order to achieve 
equality between men and women. It seems as if the aim of the provision 
could be the collapse of the gender binary. As argued for by Cook and 
Cursack, this is a very strong provision for which a general recommendation 
                                                
194 See for instance: Stuart Lau, ‘Lesbian challenges Hong Kong's decision to refuse her a 
dependant visa in court’ (South China Morning Post, 13 May 2015) 
<http://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/law-crime/article/1794647/lesbian-challenges-
hong-kongs-decision-refuse-her-dependant> accessed 20 May 2015. 
195 At para 13. 
196 At paras 51-53. 
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clarifying the scope and meaning of and obligations originating from Article 
5(a) should be created by the Committee, so as to also address compounded 
stereotypes.197  
 
Article 5(b) focuses more explicitly on the role of women in regard to the 
family, or rather in regard to maternity, by addressing “the most universalist 
traditionalist cultural norm that disadvantages women, which is the 
stereotypical assignment of sole or major responsibility for childcare to 
women”.198 This provision, though, appears to be centred around the 
heterosexual woman as its subject, who often has been left with this sole 
responsibility without receiving any recognition from society. By expressly 
mentioning the “common responsibility of men and women in the 
upbringing and development of their children [emphasis added]” rather than 
that of parents, the provision firstly seems to presuppose the existence of a 
woman and a man as parents, thereby deviating the experience of a non-
heterosexual parent. This observation is also reflected in the travaux 
préparatoires, showing that the issues of discussion were the status of 
maternity within society as well as the roles of mothers and fathers.199 One 
temporal amendment of the CSW working draft indicates the heterosexual 
view of parenthood in particular. It reads: “Suitable family education, which 
should include a proper understanding of parenthood as a social function 
and the recognition of the complementary roles of men and women in 
bearing responsibility for children […].”200  
 
Several other articles deal with different aspects of family planning, for 
instance: Article 10(h), in regard to access to education information “to help 
to ensure the health and well-being of families, including information and 
advice on family planning”; Article 12(1), which calls, on a basis of equality 
of men and women, for “access to health care services where necessary, 
including those related to family planning”; and Article 14, in regard to rural 
women, again providing for access to services in family planning. These 
provisions remain silent on whether these rights relate to family planning of 
same-sex couples.  
 
Several observations can be made in conclusion of this chapter. It seems as 
though the protection that flows from Article 16 is largely tailored around 
the lives of women that are part of the normal family. Article 16 as such 
does not seem to question the discrimination that flows from the form of the 
normal family itself. It is this discrimination which often harms LBQ 
women and which is unaddressed by Article 16. There are a few factors, 
such as the chapeau of Article 16(1), which could enable the Committee to 
change the Article’s heteronormative focus. However, the Committee has 
                                                
197 Cook and Cusack (n 17) 139-41. 
198 Frances Raday, ‘Culture, Religion, and CEDAW’s Article 5(a)’ in Beate Schöpp-
Schilling and Flinterman (n 93) 68, 74. 
199 Rehof (n 166) 86-7. 
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India, Sweden, and the UK, widening the scope of “family education” to focus not only on 
motherhood: Rehof (n 166) 86. 
 52 
not been consistent in its approach and where it does refer to same-sex 
couples, no real attempt is made to include LBQ women as full and proper 
rights subjects of Article 16. Other family-related provisions are discussed 
only briefly. Article 5, concerning gender stereotypes, in particular, has the 
potential to allow for a more Article 16 to tackle discrimination flowing 
from the form of the normal family. However, the Committee has not yet 
addressed this issue sufficiently in its general recommendations.  
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6 Violence against Women 
Violence against women as a form of discrimination against women 
occupies the focus of study in the present chapter. This topic is highly 
relevant to the investigation of CEDAW’s construction of family-related 
human rights in regard to a woman’s sexual orientation, as violence against 
women can seriously impact upon their family-related human rights. 
Violence against LBQ women specifically, like violence against women 
generally, takes different forms and occurs on various sites201. While 
violence against LBQ women might be directed at a woman as a woman, 
regardless of her sexual orientation, it can also be directed against her, or 
affect LBQ women disproportionately, due to her being a woman in 
combination with her sexual orientation. It is such latter violence against 
women that is addressed in this chapter, in an attempt to firstly outline the 
violence faced by LBQ women specifically. Since CEDAW itself does not 
address violence against women, the chapter secondly investigates how the 
CEDAW Committee has brought this topic within the scope of the 
Convention and whether it attends to the specific concerns of heterosexual 
and non-heterosexual women with equal caution. 
6.1 Violence against LBQ Women 
It is argued here that not only domestic violence202 impacts upon the family 
lives of LBQ women, but also other forms of violence that are directed 
against them as LBQ women. In many countries, and regions within them, 
same-sex couples cannot display their affection and family lives in public 
due to fear of violence from the general public, groups as well as public 
bodies203 (and, where homosexuality is sanctioned, persecution). In her 
report on discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against 
individuals based on their sexual orientation and gender identity in 2011, the 
United Nations High Commissioner of Human Rights identified several 
forms and sites of violence faced by LBQ women.204 Importantly, 
inexplicitly supporting the thesis of the interdependence of patriarchy and 
heteronormativity, she identified such violence as gender-based violence, 
thereby placing it within CEDAW’s scope:  
 
“Homophobic and transphobic violence has been recorded in all regions. 
Such violence may be physical (including murder, beatings, kidnappings, 
rape and sexual assault) or psychological (including threats, coercion and 
                                                
201 In regard to violence against women generally, this was stated by the CEDAW 
Committee in its General Recommendation No. 19 (n 19) and is elaborated upon below.  
202 The term domestic violence is used here, as it reflects the terminology of the CEDAW 
Committee. It encompasses both family violence and intimate-partner violence, to which 
might subsequently be referred to if such precision is needed in context.  
203 For instance by police and prison guards, see: United Nations High Commissioner of 
Human Rights (n 170) para 36. 
204 Ibid., para 4. 
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arbitrary deprivations of liberty). These attacks constitute a form of 
gender-based violence, driven by a desire to punish those seen as defying 
gender norms.”205  
 
Additionally, despite discriminatory practices in the family and community, 
such as exclusion from the family home, forced marriages and 
disinheritance, to name but a few206, LBQ women may furthermore 
experience violence inside their family and community that is aimed at 
enforcing gender norms and punishing deviation.207 In 1997, the UN Special 
Rapporteur on violence against women, its causes and consequences 
(SRVAW) identified that communities can be the “site of restrictions on and 
regulations of female sexuality.”208 Noting that many such restrictions are 
sanctioned by the state through laws and policies, the SRVAW also 
identified the community itself as policing women’s sexuality through 
violence: “Women who choose options which are disapproved of by the 
community, [such as] […] to live out their sexuality in ways other than 
heterosexuality, are often subjected to violence and degrading treatment.”209 
This can also be explained in terms of Butler’s heterosexual matrix; 
violence is one of the forceful means employed in trying to keep within the 
heterosexual matrix the woman who does not do her gender correctly, that 
is, in the present context, the LBQ woman.  
 
Despite the public, public bodies, communities and families, LBQ women 
may also face violence from their intimate partners. This is apparent in 
academic writing210, even though a considerable silence surrounds the issue 
generally.211 Within the area of intimate-partner violence (IPV), some 
characteristics are shared between abused women in same-sex and different-
sex relationships. That is the form the violence may take212, as well as the 
                                                
205 Ibid., para 20. 
206 For a fuller account, see: Ibid., para 66. 
207 Ibid., para 67.  
208 SRVAW ‘Report’ (1997) E/CN.4/1997/47, para. 8. 
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210 See, for instance, Natalie E. Serra, ‘Queering International Human Rights: LBGT 
Access to Domestic Remedies’ (2012-2013) 21:3 Journal of Gender, Social Policy and the 
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211 Note, for instance, that the report of the High Commissioner of Human Rights on 
discriminatory laws and practices and acts of violence against individuals based on their 
sexual orientation and gender identity (n 170) does not mention domestic or intimate-
partner violence.  
212 Namely, “physical abuse, such as punching, kicking, biting, slapping, scratching, 
strangling, burning, hair-pulling, striking with heavy or sharp objects, using weapons, or 
"withholding access to medication, medical care, food, fluids, and/or sleep";' sexual abuse; 
psychological abuse, such as the use of harassment, blackmail, isolation, religious or 
cultural justifications, or the threat of harm to the survivor, loved ones, or pets; verbal 
abuse; the destruction of property; the use of finances, immigration status, or HIV status to 
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motivation of the perpetrator, namely, the maintenance and control by that 
partner over the other.213 However, same-sex IPV also possesses unique 
characteristics. The violence directed against the victim does not occur in a 
social vacuum, but rather in a social setting within which the victim will 
additionally have to deal with homophobia in general. This can lead to the 
victim being unable to leave the site of abuse or to seek help, for instance, 
because homosexuality is not considered legal in that state, because the 
abuser threatens to out her partner’s sexual orientation, or because of further 
discrimination the victim would have to face from an untrained police force, 
to name but a few.214 Others might not want to report the violence due to a 
fear that addressing domestic violence within same-sex couples could 
further stigmatise the LBQ community.215 It ought to be understood, then, 
that “[s]ociety's fear and hatred of homosexuality causes isolation and 
increases the vulnerability of […] lesbians to domestic abuse”216. The same 
applies, of course, to bisexual and queer women.  
6.2 CEDAW and Violence against Women 
The issue of violence against women does not find a formal and explicit 
place in any of CEDAW’s articles. Instead, the Committee has, in its 
general recommendations No. 12217 and, especially, No. 19218, brought the 
issue within the ambit of CEDAW’s anti-discrimination and equality 
framework and has outlined relating state party obligations. This is 
particularly interesting in that the debate surrounding discrimination against 
women, including the debate on intersectionality, had moved on ten years in 
regard to general recommendation No. 12 and thirteen years in regard to 
general recommendation No. 19, since the creation of CEDAW. While 
being somewhat restricted by the interpretive limitations that were outlined 
in chapter three, the creator of the general recommendations, i.e. the 
Committee, as an independent expert body was not to the same degree 
restricted by the political difficulties that may have surrounded the creation 
of CEDAW itself. This opportunity to be attentive to women’s different 
identities, and to address women other than the heterosexual woman, 
especially in regard to intimate-partner violence, was, however, missed. As 
expressed by Christine Chinkin, the Committee “has not explicitly 
addressed violence within same-sex relationships.”219 
 
While general recommendation No. 12 instructs states parties to include in 
their periodic reports certain information about violence against women, 
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general recommendation No. 19 expands upon the understanding and 
obligations regarding gender-based violence against women. It makes clear 
that “[g]ender-based violence is a form of discrimination that seriously 
inhibits women’s ability to enjoy rights and freedoms on a basis of equality 
with men”220. The Committee proceeds to state that the elimination of all 
forms of violence is required of states parties for a full implementation of 
the Convention.221 In doing so states parties are not only under an obligation 
to eliminate gender-based violence against women committed by or on 
behalf of state bodies, but are further under an obligation to prevent, 
investigate, and punish private acts of gender-based violence against 
women.222   
 
The Committee defines gender-based violence, as “violence that is directed 
against a woman because she is a woman or that affects women 
disproportionately.”223 As such it is included within CEDAW’s definition of 
discrimination against women generally.224 While speaking of ‘gender-
based violence’, which as such does not refer only to women,225 the 
Committee connects such violence to women, and hence, in the context of 
CEDAW, gender-based violence refers only to gender-based violence 
against women. Chinkin further explains the Committee’s use of the term 
‘gender-based violence’ in that it is violence against women that is 
motivated by gender-related factors.226 It is for example exercised in order 
to punish what is seemingly deviant female behaviour or to exercise male 
control.227 However, neither does the Committee make direct reference to 
diversity of women, nor does it refer to the effect intersectionality might 
have on violence exercised against certain groups of women. This seems 
fatal for women in same-sex relationships, who experience specifically 
motivated forms of violence exercised against them as LBQ women, or who 
cannot leave the site of violence due to homophobic attitudes in society as 
discussed above. By not addressing such intersectional discrimination, the 
Committee is complicit in silencing the issue of violence against LBQ 
women.  
 
Arguably, the experiences of LBQ women in regard to violence against 
them may still be included within the scope of the general recommendation, 
not least did the High Commissioner of Human Rights call homophobic and 
transphobic violence ‘gender-based violence’.228 Furthermore, while the 
Committee does not elaborate upon the meaning of ‘disproportionately’, 
Chinkin argues that “it is apparent that it applies both to forms of violence 
                                                
220 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 19’ (n 19) para 1. 
221 Ibid., para 4. 
222 Ibid., para 9. 
223 Ibid., para 6. 
224 Ibid. 
225 For instance, the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural rights has referred to 
‘gender-based violence’ as applicable to both women and men: Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural, ‘General Comment No. 16’ (2005) E/C.12/2005/3. 
226 Chinkin (n 219) 452. 
227 Ibid., 452. 
228 See above, n 205. 
 57 
that are committed against women in greater numbers than against men, and 
violence that has a disproportionate effect upon women’s lives”.229 In this 
way, IPV against women in same-sex relationships could be incorporated 
under the scope of the definition, even if the violence is not exercised by a 
man. However, it is a vast disappointment that once again it needs to be 
argued for CEDAW’s protection to apply beyond the created norm (i.e. the 
heterosexual woman) to the deviant. It seems that even in one of the 
Committee’s more creative works a heterosexual woman is presupposed, 
whose human rights protection may later be extended to LBQ women by 
way of interpretation.  
 
Arguing that gender-based violence against women “includes acts that 
inflict physical, mental or sexual harm or suffering, threats of such acts, 
coercion and other deprivations of liberty”,230 the Committee follows the 
structure of the Convention to incorporate aspects of gender-based violence 
against women within CEDAW’s articles, maintaining that “[g]ender-based 
violence may breach specific provisions of the Convention, regardless of 
whether those provisions expressly mention violence”231. Of specific 
interest to the current analysis are the Committee’s comments on CEDAW’s 
Articles 2(f), 5 and 10(c) (combined) and on CEDAW’s Article 16 and 5, 
also combined.  
 
In the former, the Committee comments that traditional attitudes and 
stereotypes that view women as subordinate to men perpetuate gender-based 
violence against women, involving different types of violence and 
coercion.232 While the Committee identifies that “[s]uch prejudices and 
practices may justify gender-based violence as a form of protection or 
control  of women” 233,  no connection is made explicitly to intersecting 
practices and prejudice. Therefore, while addressing the role of gender 
stereotypes in perpetuating gender-based violence against women, the 
Committee does not acknowledge compounded gender stereotypes and 
hence deviates to a certain extent the experiences of women who are subject 
to violence due to them being LBQ women. For instance the Committee 
states that the underlying consequence of such gender-based violence 
against women is to keep women in subordinate roles234, but in regard to 
LBQ women it is often more specific than that. Namely, such violence is 
used to keep women within men’s (sexual) control and power. 235 
A further example is that the Committee does not address the effect that the 
gender stereotype of women being submissive to men translates into the 
                                                
229 Chinkin (n 219) 452. 
230 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 19’ (n 19) para 6. 
231 Ibid., para 6. 
232 Ibid., para 11. 
233 Ibid., para 11. 
234 Ibid., para 11. 
235 For instance, in South Africa the practice of ‘corrective rape’ is exercised by some in 
order to ‘cure’ lesbian women from their homosexuality. Note however, that is has indeed 
been addressed by the Committee in its Concluding Observations (CO): CO South Africa 
(2011) CEDAW/C/ZAF/CO/4 paras 39-40. 
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compounded stereotype that women in same-sex relationship are not 
submissive to their partners and hence never experience IPV. 
 
In regard to the latter, the Committee comments that family violence exists 
in all societies and that “[w]ithin family relationships women of all ages are 
subjected to violence of all kinds”. While here the Committee does not 
explicitly refer to the sex of the abuser, hence rendering this comment 
applicable to women experiencing IPV in same-sex and different-sex 
relationships, it nonetheless seems to focus on heterosexual women. For 
instance, the Committee names lack of economic independence as a reason 
for not being able to leave a violent relationship236, inexplicitly referring to 
the economic imbalance between women and men, but not to other factors, 
such as the ones most relevant to women in violent same-sex relationships, 
as discussed above (see chapter 6.1). 
 
Furthermore, the specific recommendations made by the Committee in 
general recommendation No. 19 do not refer explicitly to gender-based 
violence against women affecting LBQ women. While one could argue that 
the obligations relate to LBQ women as they relate to heterosexual women 
(despite them being tailored around the lives of heterosexual women in the 
first place), this does not seem reflected in the constructive dialogue 
between states parties and the Committee in the form of the periodic 
reviews of states. While in its Concluding Observations the Committee 
does, at times, refer to violence against LBQ women,237 an analysis of the 
Committee’s Concluding Observations of the year 2015 to date show an 
inconsistent and inadequate approach. In the eight Concluding Observations 
adopted in March 2015, only one addresses LBQ women expressly in regard 
to violence against women. The Concluding Observations regarding 
Ecuador’s eighth and ninth periodic reports, the Committee states its 
concern regarding “[i]nformation on violence against women, including 
lesbian, bisexual and transgender women”238 and recommends the adoption 
of a specific system combatting violence against women, again including 
LBT women239. The fact that only one out of eight Concluding Observations 
in the same month of the Committee’s work included comments on gender-
based violence against LBT women240, points to the deficit created by not 
                                                
236 CEDAW Committee, ‘General Recommendation No. 19’ (n 19) para 23. 
237 For instance, in its Concluding Observations regarding Sweden, the Committee 
congratulated Sweden for “the adoption, in November 2007, of the action plan to combat 
men’s violence against women, violence and oppression in the name of honour and 
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CEDAW/C/AZE/CO/5, paras 22-23; CEDAW Committee, CO Denmark (2015) 
CEDAW/C/DNK/CO/8, paras 17-18; CEDAW Committee, CO Eritrea (2015) 
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stating in the general recommendation No. 19 specifically that states parties 
have to report on the gender-based violence against LBTQ women, 
including domestic violence. Considering that homophobic violence occurs 
in all regions241 and considering the lack of general knowledge and 
information about intimate partner violence in same-sex relationships, the 
Committee should have instructed the state parties specifically to report on 
this issue and incorporate specific aspects in its strategy to eliminate gender-
based violence against women.  
 
This chapter found that LBQ women face violence from the public and 
public bodies as well as their families, communities and intimate partners. 
Their non-heterosexual sexual orientation can play a decisive role in the 
motive for this violence and/or in the victims’ inability to access help. 
However, the Committee has not addressed these concerns in its general 
recommendations when placing violence against women within the scope of 
CEDAW. Again inconsistencies appear in regard to their handling of 
intersectional discrimination against women, which is further reflected in 
the concluding observations; most of them do not address violence against 
LBQ women. As was largely the case with Article 16, the issue of violence 
against women, as it relates to CEDAW, too seems to presuppose a 
heterosexual woman.  
 
 
                                                                                                                        
CEDAW/C/KGZ/CO/4, paras 17-18; CEDAW Committee, CO Maldives (2015) 
CEDAW/C/MDV/CO/4-5, paras 44-45; CEDAW Committee, CO Tuvalu (2015) 
CEDAW/C/TUV/CO/3-4, paras 21-22.  
241 UN High Commissioner of Human Rights (n 170) para 20. 
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7 German Case Study 
This chapter provides insight into the communication exchange between the 
Committee and Germany, focusing on family-related issues of LBQ women 
in Germany’s implementation of CEDAW. This is done in the context of 
Germany’s sixth round of periodic reporting under CEDAW. Such 
investigation is deemed necessary as the periodic reviews of states parties to 
CEDAW constitute a big part of the Committee’s work and hence may 
reveal the significance (or otherwise) the Committee allocates to the family-
related human rights of LBQ women. It is further interesting to look at the 
Committee’s interaction with states since, and as explained in chapter three, 
the Committee does not have the power to legally order states to implement 
certain measures, but instead can only urge and recommend the state to do 
so. How then does the Committee handle the issue of LBQ women’s family-
related human rights, that by many is deemed a ‘sensitive issue’?242  
 
It is, inter alia, for this reason that Germany has been chosen as a case 
study. Germany is one of the states that, while affording some rights to 
same-sex couples, does not afford women in same-sex relations the same 
domestic family and marriage rights as women in different-sex relations.243 
While it has yet a long way to go in order to attend appropriately to the 
feminist/queer critique of normal and deviant families, it has gone some 
way towards a transition of the normal family as recognized by law. The 
CEDAW Committee should hence feel comfortable in making further 
recommendations towards this. It is therefore of interest to analyse whether 
and how the CEDAW Committee has addressed or ignored family-related 
issues of LBQ women in Germany. The sixth periodic report submitted by 
Germany in 2007244, a civil society shadow report, the subsequent dialog 
between the Committee and Germany, as well as the Committee’s resulting 
concluding observations in 2009245 are all looked at. The most recent 
concluding observations from other States are also mentioned in order to 
draw several comparisons. Lastly, a few assumptions are made as to why 
the Committee addresses some issues concerning LBQ women while 
ignoring others.  
                                                
242 For instance, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon stated: “Some say that sexual 
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under article 18 of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination 
against Women, Sixth periodic report of Germany’ (2007) CEDAW/C/DEU/6. 
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7.1 The Constructive Dialouge 
In its sixth periodic report, submitted to the Committee in October 2007 and 
thereby starting another round constructive dialogue concerning the 
implementation of CEDAW, Germany considers the lives of lesbian women 
(“homosexual partners”) in its reporting on Article 16, that is in regard to 
equality of women and men in marriage and family relations.246 While the 
formation of marriage is reserved only for monogamous different-sex 
relationships in Germany, monogamous same-sex partners may form a 
registered life partnership under the Act on Registered Life Partnerships.247 
Reporting on the revisions made to the Act on Registered Life Partnerships 
in 2004248, Germany states in its periodic report to CEDAW that the Act 
seeks to “bring more into line” the laws governing registered partnerships 
with those governing marriage, especially in regard to maintenance 
payments, matrimonial property and grounds for suspension.249 This is to be 
done “with a view to regulating maintenance payments, matrimonial 
property, the grounds for suspension, by introducing a process of 
distributing pension claims, survivors’ maintenance in the statutory 
insurance system, allowing registered partners to adopt stepchildren”.250 
While this certainly indicates to the Committee that Germany, firstly, 
considers the issue of same-sex relationships to fall within the scope of 
CEDAW and, secondly, is working towards equality between same-sex and 
different-sex couples, it is nevertheless a half-hearted attempt. Especially 
the phrase to “bring more into line” shows that differences in regulations do 
continue to exist, though they are not elaborated upon by the state. Hence, 
Germany appears to be presenting in a positive light legislative changes that 
maintain differential treatment perhaps amounting to discrimination against 
women in same-sex relationships.  
 
In their shadow reports, women’s and other organisations dimmed this light 
however. An alliance of German women’s organisations, including the 
Organisation of Lesbians and Gays in Germany (Lesben- und 
Schwulenverband in Deutschland e.V.), submitted a joint report dedicating a 
whole section on what they call “rainbow families”, that is, families headed 
by same-sex partners.251 The main critique of this shadow report over 
Germany’s periodic report provides that the Act on Registered Life 
Partnerships provides for equality of duties between registered partnerships 
and married couples but not for equality of rights. According to the report, 
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differences exist in several areas such as that of taxation. While married 
couples are able to pool their tax returns, same-sex families are unable to do 
so, resulting in a disadvantage of around EUR 300 where the both partners 
earn a gross income of EUR 3.000 per month.252 The report further 
considers the existing differences in regard to children of same-sex and 
different-sex parents. Disparities exist in regard to the law of descent as well 
as adoption. In cases of artificial insemination, a married partner who 
wanted the child but has no biological connection to the child is still 
automatically considered the child’s parent, while a registered life partner 
parent without biological connection would have to adopt the child.253 Joint 
adoption, too, is available only to different-sex parents while same-sex 
parents need to adopt the child individually. The alternative report stresses 
that the chances of success of such individual adoptions are small, 
however.254 If, then, the child is not the legal child of both parents, which 
can happen even if the parents are in a registered partnership and care for 
the child jointly, the social (as opposed to legal) parent is legally regarded as 
being childless in regard to that child. The report maintains that “[f]or 
children this constellation leaves a large gap in protection with regard to 
maintenance rights, inheritance or in the event that the legal parent should 
die”.255  
 
Importantly, the alternative report therefore uncovers the actual differential 
treatment of women in same-sex and different-sex relationships. However, it 
should be noted that what is addressed is mostly the legal situation of 
women in registered life partnerships and, at the same time, the entire 
section is structured in a way so as to argue that this differential / 
discriminatory treatment is disadvantageous to children of same-sex 
mothers. One ought to wonder whether this assimilationist way of framing 
family-related human rights of LBQ women is due to the authors’ lack of 
will to include families that do not copy the stereotypical heterosexual 
family, or whether it is a strategic move in order to include at least some 
same-sex partners within the narrow heteronormative way in which 
CEDAW itself has formulated these rights?  In either case, it prevents the 
opening up of the discussion to include other equally important aspects of 
family lives of women in same-sex relationships, such as domestic violence 
and migration.  
 
Regardless of the force behind it, the alternative report seems to have 
impacted the Committee in taking up the issue. In its list of issues and 
questions with regard to the consideration of the periodic reports, which 
predated the alternative report, the Committee did not raise the issue of the 
registered partnerships at all.256 However, it did ask related questions during 
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256 CEDAW Committee ‘List of issues and questions with regard to the consideration of the 
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its subsequent meeting with the German delegation.257 Having been asked 
about the issues raised in the alternative report, namely taxation, adoption 
and fertilization treatment258, the German delegation provided an answer 
that, while the language used attempted to soften the problems that existed, 
suggest unequal treatment of married couples and registered partnership 
couples: “Couples in registered partnerships were mostly treated in the same 
way as married couples in terms of family, inheritance and almost all other 
legislation. Maintenance provisions, social security and provisions for 
foreign nationals were the same in both cases. There were some tax 
differences, but in general the treatment of civil partnerships compared 
favourably to that of other countries. In the case of a civil partnership, only 
one partner could adopt a child, as the European adoption agreement of 
1976 specified that only married couples could adopt a child as a couple. No 
time frame has yet been set for the adoption of a planned amendment which 
would enable individual Länder [states] to decide whether both civil 
partners could be adoptive parents”.259 
 
Despite Germany’s admission to disfavouring treatment of registered 
partnership couples, the Committee did not bring up the issue in its 
concluding observations on Germany and hence did not make relating 
recommendations.260 It does not address women in same-sex relations when 
discussing taxation of married couples (splitting) in regard to reconciliation 
of family and work life261, and neither are LBQ women addressed in the 
Committee’s discussion on vulnerable groups of women. One can thus 
conclude that the dialogue was rather destructive for women in same-sex 
relationships: while Germany confirmed the issues raised in the alternative 
report, the Committee does not seem to consider it worthy of being raised in 
the concluding observations and hence appears to legitimise the practice by 
not declaring it contrary to CEDAW’s provisions. This observation further 
calls into question the transparency of the ‘constructive’ dialogue-process, 
as one does not know why the Committee did not consider the 
discriminatory practice as relevant.  
7.2 Other Concluding Observations 
It is an interesting undertaking to compare the concluding observations for 
Germany in 2009 with recent concluding observations where the lives of 
LBQ women have actually been addressed by the Committee. 
 
The concluding observations on Ecuador in 2015262 address LBQ women in 
regard to several issues. Firstly, in regard to stereotypes and harmful 
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practices, the Committee expresses concern over the continuation of ‘”de-
homosexualization” practices in clinics established for treatment of drug-
addiction, and recommends the implementation of the criminal code 
prohibiting such practices and to adopt relating mechanisms ensuring its 
implementation.263 The Committee further expresses concerns as to 
information on the gender-based violence against, inter alia, lesbian and 
bisexual women, “including reports of mistreatment by the police, and the 
absence of official statistics on complaints and cases brought to the criminal 
justice system.”264 It correspondingly recommends the establishment of a 
monitoring system as well as training for judges, police and others.265 The 
Committee does not, however, address LBQ women when discussing 
equality in marriage and family relations.266  
 
The Committee further addressed LBQ women in its concluding 
observations on Kyrgyzstan in 2015, showing concern over a proposed law 
that “introduces criminal and administrative sanctions for the ‘formation of 
a positive attitude to non-traditional sexual relations’, which may 
discriminate against certain groups of women, including lesbian, bisexual, 
transgender and intersex women”.267 The Committee urges Kyrgyzstan not 
to adopt the draft law and to instead adopt comprehensive anti-
discrimination legislation.268 The Committee also expresses concern over of 
persisting discrimination over, inter alia, lesbian and bisexual women in 
health care services legislation.269 Lastly, the Committee addresses 
intersecting forms of discrimination that disadvantaged groups of women, 
including lesbian and bisexual women, face and recommends the state party 
to undertake specific measures to this end.270 LBQ women are not addressed 
specifically in the Committee’s discussion on marriage and family 
relations.271 
 
In its concluding observations on Denmark in 2015, the Committee notes 
the inadequacy of support services for lesbian, bisexual and transgender 
women, recommending Denmark to “consider assessing the difficulties 
faced by lesbian, bisexual and transgender women with the aim of ensuring 
that they fully enjoy their rights”.272 These broad statements find no more 
specific counterparts in sections on family relations, family reunifications or 
violence against women, however. 
 
While it has to be noted that any comparative observations on these are 
necessarily restricted due to the small number of concluding observations 
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considered, some critical remarks will be made nevertheless. For it is 
puzzling that the Committee seems to address the rights of LBQ women in 
some areas but not others. That is to say, the Committee does not seem to 
shy away from addressing discrimination in the form of criminalisation of 
non-heterosexual sexual activities, gender-based violence against lesbian 
and bisexual women, harmful practices and general discrimination against 
lesbian and bisexual women (while it does not address queer women). In 
none of the concluding observations considered does the Committee address 
family relations in regard to LBQ women, however.  
  
It appears that the Committee affords LBQ women some anti-discrimination 
rights under CEDAW on the basis of them being discriminated as LBQ 
women, but not all. As is evident from the German case study, 
discrimination exists against LBQ women in regard to their family lives. 
LBQ women in registered life partnerships do not enjoy the same rights as 
married heterosexual women. The Committee, however does not address 
this in its concluding observations. One needs to wonder why and how this 
is the case? Is the extent to which non-discrimination rights under CEDAW 
apply to LBQ women as LBQ women at the discretion of the Committee, or 
is this determined by the formulation of CEDAW’s articles? Noting the 
particularly heteronormative language of Article 16 as discussed in chapter 
five and the more progressive interpretations of Article 1 as discussed in 
chapter four, perhaps it is less surprising that the Committee does not 
address equality of family relations of women in same-sex relationships but 
does address discrimination against lesbian and bisexual women more 
generally. However, it seems somewhat contradictory that discrimination 
against women includes LBQ women, yet this definition does not infiltrate 
marriage and family relations. Even where the Committee does show 
interest in the family relations of LBQ women, as was the case with the 
questions posed to Germany, it is only to the extent with which same-sex 
partners copy married different-sex couples.273  
7.3 Analysis of the Committee’s Stance 
While the Committee seems to have gradually become more attentive to 
intersectional discrimination against women, it nevertheless does not 
address discrimination issues specific to LBQ women’s family lives. This 
was shown in chapters four to six in regard to the Committee’s general 
recommendations. Furthermore, this seems to be the case with the 
Committee’s concluding observations, as was seen in the current chapter. 
The question hence arises as to why the Committee takes such a somewhat 
arbitrary position? This section ties together the influencing factors that 
were mentioned throughout the thesis.  
 
To begin with, it cannot be stated for sure why the Committee has taken the 
positions it has taken due to a lack of transparency in this regard. For 
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instance, the Committee did not clarify why it has not taken up the issue of 
same sex registered partnerships in its concluding observations on Germany. 
Only assumptions can hence be made.   
 
It was mentioned in chapter three that the Committee is not a clearly 
authoritative body. It can therefore be argued that the Committee has to be 
strategic in its interpretation of CEDAW for states parties not to disregard 
its work. It was also mentioned in the current chapter that issues concerning 
LBQ women are often seen as ‘sensitive’ matters. Taking into account also 
the interest of states to maintain the normal family, being the unit upon 
which much of society is built (see chapter five), perhaps the Committee 
does not feel able to address specific family related discrimination against 
LBQ women. For it may fear that states parties would not accept statements 
in this regard.  On the one hand, this points towards the fragile nature of the 
human rights framework. Should human rights not be able to protect 
especially the most marginalised? On the other hand, the non-authoritative 
character of the Committee does not seem to be the only influencing factor. 
This seems evident in the German case study. Since Germany had already 
provided same-sex couples with some rights similar to married couples, the 
Committee did not have to fear that Germany would be entirely unreceptive 
in this regard.  
 
It seems to be arguable that members of the Committee themselves may be 
influenced – perhaps unknowingly – by stereotypes concerning the normal 
family unit. This would point towards a lack of expertise or awareness in 
regard to intersectional discrimination against women, especially in regard 
to LBQ women. As has been outlined in chapter three, it is states parties that 
propose and elect members of the CEDAW Committee. This, once again, 
seems to create somewhat of a contradictory situation. If states have no 
interest to challenge the normal family as largely protected by CEDAW, 
why would they appoint members of the Committee with special expertise 
in the area?  
 
It was shown in this chapter that the Committee has adopted an inconsistent 
approach in including issues specific to LBQ women in the scope of 
CEDAW. It must be concluded that the stereotypical heterosexual family 
prevails in the Committee’s ‘constructive’ dialogue with states. It can be 
argued that several factors influence the Committee’s arbitrary position. On 
the one hand this situation might exist due to the Committee’s non-
authoritative character. On the other hand, it can also be argued that the 
Committee itself is influenced by stereotypes in regard to the normal family 
unit.  
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8 Conclusion 
Analysing CEDAW through my analytical approach has shown that the 
category of ‘women’ as protected by CEDAW does not always honour the 
diversity that exists within it. At least some of CEDAW’s provisions seem 
to insist on a certain notion of womanhood, and those provisions and 
obligations relating to family issues undoubtedly form part of this group. 
Problematic from the beginning is CEDAW’s lack of acknowledging the 
intersection between discrimination against women based on sex and other 
systems of oppression and subordination. As has been argued, LBQ women 
often face discrimination in order to compel them to oblige by, or punish 
them for deviating from, male (sexual) domination. These struggles affect 
women as LBQ women and are hence particular struggles that are not 
expressly acknowledged by Article 1 of the Convention. While the CEDAW 
Committee has to some extent remedied the absence of intersectional forms 
of discrimination in Article 1 through its recent general recommendations, 
this revelation has not infiltrated the understanding of the family, sadly.  
 
This was shown not only through the investigation of general 
recommendations relating to Article 16, but also through the dialogue 
between the Committee and Germany in which the differences that existed 
in the treatment of same-sex and different-sex couples were not expressly 
considered to be contrary to CEDAW’s understanding of equality. While 
sceptics could argue that the Committee is bound to CEDAW’s 
heteronormative formulation of family-related provisions, my analysis 
shows that the Committee appears generally unwilling/inattentive to include 
the particular struggles of LBQ women in the family sphere: The obligations 
in regard to gender-based violence against women, which were formulated 
by the Committee, also largely presuppose a heterosexual woman, 
especially in regard to domestic violence and, hence, disregard the particular 
discrimination LBQ women face. Furthermore, there is room for the 
argument that with the Committee’s current understanding of discrimination 
including forms of intersecting discrimination, it could place the family-
related struggles of LBQ women within the chapeau of Article 16. Instead, 
however, the Committee itself seems influenced by compounded gender 
stereotypes that exist in regard to womanhood and the family.  
 
These observations concerning the subject of CEDAW result from an 
examination of the category of women as perceived through CEDAW’s 
family-related provisions. Within the theoretical framework used, one 
necessarily encounters a tension between arguing for diversity within the 
category of women on the one hand, while arguing against categorisations 
generally. It is important, however, to distinguish between ontology and 
political strategy. In order to improve women’s conditions of life, 
strategically the existence of a category of women ought to be accepted. 
This is the case since, as a social, though not natural, fact the category of 
women does exist and is oppressed as such. Being a social fact, however, 
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the category of women is not only diverse but also unclosed and it should be 
recognised as such. Since CEDAW was established at a point in time where 
the exercise of questioning categories was yet to be born274, the Convention 
is set out to improve conditions of women’s lives without being concerned 
with the existence of categories, not to mention the move towards the 
abolishment of such categories. As a result, CEDAW itself often contributes 
to the creation of a norm and its deviants, for instance the heterosexual 
woman as the norm and the categories of lesbian and bisexual women as its 
deviants. Instead of valuing the diversity of women, it is complicit in 
creating categories of women, extending through the notion of equality with 
those rights that men enjoy to the category of the woman that is deemed the 
appropriate woman. In relation to CEDAW’s family provision, is the 
appropriate woman is the heterosexual woman in a monogamous 
relationship.  
 
Despite the creation of different categories of women, CEDAW is further 
complicit in reinforcing the normal family and in rendering this family 
central to a woman’s life. While it was pushed by women’s rights 
movements towards an infiltration of human rights into the private sphere in 
order to reach women’s lives there, CEDAW gave into this pressure by 
putting emphasis only on a certain type of family, namely the sexual family. 
The notion of the family, the Committee has itself admitted, is a 
construct.275 However, through trying to create equality within the 
heterosexual form of this construct, rather than to enable women to live the 
family life (or otherwise) they themselves envision, CEDAW too is 
complicit in concealing the fact that the heterosexual family as framed by 
human rights law is in fact a construct. Instead it legitimises states in 
providing preferential treatment to women who fall under this construct, 
who act seemingly normal, as opposed to women who do not. CEDAW 
therefore on the one hand discriminates against women, who, through their 
agency, do not place their lives within the heterosexual form of this 
construct (the normal family). On the other hand, it oppresses women in 
trying to restrict their agency of choosing a life that is compelling to them. 
Even where the Committee has tried to broaden the family to which 
CEDAW refers, it has only been able (or willing) to do so in relation to 
same-sex couples who copy the traditional/sexual family in form.  
 
Another consideration to be had is whether it is authentic to believe that the 
well-oiled machine of heteropartriarchy has simply given in to the pressure 
created through women’s rights movements by weakening itself? A reading 
of CEDAW’s Article 16 as undertaken in this thesis suggests otherwise. 
Through the pressure heteropatriarchy faced in the lead-up to the creation of 
CEDAW, it saw a threat to its existence that needed to be dealt with. As is 
known from Article 16 of the UDHR, the construct of the family is the unit 
upon which society is built, that is the heteropatriarchal society. Dissolving 
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the special protection surrounding this unit, assembled to control and 
suppress, and therefore questioning the unit itself, could hence mean a threat 
to the entire heteropatriarchal society, the structure of which relies on its 
support. Having analysed Article 16 of CEDAW it appears, however, that 
heteropatriarchy has dealt with this threat efficiently. It seems that through 
CEDAW, the family unit has in fact grown stronger as it leads women to 
believe that it has removed discrimination against women from the scope of 
the family, thereby once again legitimizing the normal family unit. Having 
regained legitimacy, the family unit as envisioned and protected by 
CEDAW in turn reinforces heteropatriarchy as it is inherently exclusionary 
and limits women’s ability to shape their own lives.   
 
The Committee has taken limited action to remedy this situation or to 
expose the privilege Article 16 passes to heterosexual women. A new 
approach is needed, an approach that requires bold Committee members, 
dedicated to intersectional transformative equality and skilled to recognize 
and circumvent the heteropatriarchal attitudes of states and their attached 
political pressure. Such an approach, which could take shape in a general 
recommendation, would require a reconceptualization of and focus on 
Article 16’s chapeau. A broad and enabling understanding of the words 
“states parties shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination 
against women in all matters relating to marriage and family relations” 
would oblige states to allow and enable women to develop freely their own 
understanding of family and to value and respect different forms of families, 
without discriminating amongst them. Such an understanding of family 
relations and the choice of women thereto would then also inform other 
provisions of CEDAW, other general recommendations and the constructive 
dialogue between the Committee and states parties. While this, of course, 
cannot remedy the heteronormative focus of the rest of Article 16 and other 
provisions, it would nevertheless be a step towards rendering the 
Convention less discriminatory and more effective in its attempt to 
eliminate all forms of discrimination against women.  
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